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6Foreword
Dear Reader,
I am pleased to commend the publication titled ‘The Real Politics of Bangladesh: The 
inside story of Local Power Brokers’ by Manzoor Hasan (O.B.E.), Dr. Jonathan Rose and 
Sultan Muhammed Zakaria financially supported by the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation SDC in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has made remarkable progress on MDGs and witnessed steady economic 
growth. It has achieved significant progresses in the areas of poverty alleviation, primary 
school enrolment, gender parity in primary and secondary level education, lowering the 
infant and under five mortality rate and maternal mortality ratio, improving immunization 
coverage and reducing the incidence of communicable diseases. Incidence of poverty has 
been declining at an annual rate of 2.47 percent in Bangladesh during the last couple 
of years. However, as our own histories of development shows, not all good things come 
together. Today, Bangladesh is undergoing rapid social, economic and political changes, 
with some negative trends.
Local governance is a constitutional obligation in Bangladesh and a declared priority 
of the country’s ruling party. Strengthening of local governance is also one of three key 
areas in the cooperation between Switzerland and Bangladesh. Owing to the country’s 
highly centralized character and the challenges of local level resource mobilization, 
the Bangladeshi government’s approach is the incremental devolution of functions and 
functionaries from the central level to the Union, Pourashava, Upazila or District level. 
The process of equipping accountable elected representatives of local government 
institutions with authority, responsibilities, capacities and the mind-set to serve the people 
will take a long time in the young democracy Bangladesh, but important achievements 
have been made in recent years. An increasingly young, demanding and well-informed 
population will keep pressing for adequate public services and goods as well as equitable 
resources and opportunities and better governance in general. And Bangladesh’s political 
establishment understands that these claims can only be addressed by improving the 
effectiveness of local development and thus further pursuing the decentralization and local 
governance reform.
The power brokers (mastaans) play a significant role in local governance and local 
decision making processes in Bangladesh. The presence of mastaans – the term for local 
strongmen or mafia – is another distinctive feature of the local governance as well as 
power structure in Bangladesh. These individuals play three main inter-related roles within 
local governance process and society:
• first, they form part of the structure of the political parties, often overlapping for 
example with local political leaders;
• second, they are active within the organisations and networks of organised crime, in 
which their own business interests and those of local politicians often become blurred 
since they use their power and influence to promote and support the careers of activists 
and politicians;
i
7• third, they act as intermediaries or brokers in gate-keeping roles around access to 
public services (such as health, education, housing, police, etc.) and access to natural 
resources (such as public owned land, private land, water bodies, etc.).
Political accumulation involves using their organizational muscle to make money in a 
variety of ways, including capturing government contracts with large margins, collecting 
protection money, organizing social groups including the poor for redistributive demands 
and capturing payoffs from the state or private enterprise as ‘mediators’ of these conflicts, 
appropriating public and private assets that are insufficiently protected, and so on. The 
more notorious political entrepreneurs describe themselves as mastaans, but the latter are 
variants within a wide range of organizers who differ only in terms of the level of violence 
they use, their social respectability and the social level they operate at. Both descriptions 
of mastaans emphasize their ability to use violence as well as their diverse functions, i.e. 
covering their role in local politics and their role as an intermediary with government. 
Interestingly, both also observe a potentially positive role of mastaans in terms of the 
mobilization of resources through government – whether in the form of benefits or services- 
for local communities. 
The present publication is an in-depth exploratory study on aspects of the power brokers and 
their role in informal power politics in Bangladesh. It primarily explored their backgrounds 
and their influence on local government and politics, as well as their connections with the 
various elements of Bangladeshi society, their sources of income, and their organization. 
The purpose is to provide – for the first time – an in-depth investigation of one of the central 
actors in local politics of Bangladesh, who has potentially strong influence over local and 
national governance, particularly law and order, land rights, service delivery, SMEs, 
public procurement and infrastructure construction. 
It provides comprehensive insights for policy makers, researchers, academia, development 
partners, advocacy agents and relevant NGOs in Bangladesh and outside to better 
understand the significant dimensions of informal power politics and roles and influences 
of power brokers over decentralization and local governance processes in Bangladesh. 
Based on a solid body of evidence, this study makes a strong call for a further transfer 
of powers and authority from the central government to the elected LGIs and establishes 
inclusive participatory governance at all levels. It underlines that for a harmonious power 
relation between formal and informal institutions, a concerted effort on the part of the 
political leadership, bureaucracy, parliament, LGIs, civil society and other relevant actors 
will be needed. In quest for an inclusive and participatory development, the government 
at the central level needs to act coherently to allow the transfer of relevant formal power 
into the hands of LGIs and establish transparent, inclusive and participatory governance 
at all level. The voice of the common people, especially, the poor and disadvantaged and 
women must be heard and placed at the helm of administration at the local level. 
The driving idea behind the research was that development programmes which work 
with an understanding of the influence of power brokers can potentially reduce leakages, 
better allocate resources, improve economic conditions for the poor and develop the 
quality of democratic representation. 
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8We see the political conflicts taking place, which often turn violent; mastaans also remind 
us of many of the powerful and exploitative political figures found in other parts of the 
world. The figures described in this study conjure up the images of characters from the 
novels of Charles Dickens in 19th century industrial England. As such, this study is very 
timely, given the current situation. There are negative trends that require attention from 
all stakeholders, and will become even worse if bold action is not taken in Bangladesh.
On behalf of the Embassy of Switzerland in Bangladesh and the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation, I would like to thank Manzoor Hasan (O.B.E.), Dr. 
Jonathan Rose and Sultan Muhammed Zakaria for their efforts in preparing this important 
study. I hope that this book will not only serve as a work of reference for interested 
readers and practitioners in Bangladesh but also inspire future researchers to continue 
the analytical work in the field of local formal and informal power politics and political 
democratic governance in Bangladesh.
Christian Fotsch
Ambassador of Switzerland to Bangladesh
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11. Introduction
On April 24, 2013, an eight story building named Rana Plaza collapsed in the middle 
of the day, trapping thousands of workers – mainly from the garment factories inside. In 
the end, despite large-scale rescue efforts to pick through the rubble, over 1,100 people 
died. As the world became aware of what would become one of the largest industrial 
disasters in history, stories emerged of the owner of the building, Sohel Rana, who was 
one of the main culprits of the tragedy. A street-level political and criminal figure, he was 
the right hand man of the then Member of Parliament. Alongside his shady dealings in 
acquiring the land and construction rights for Rana Plaza, he was well known for his 
land grabbing and other criminal activities. The day before the collapse, despite cracks 
emerging in support pillars and a government engineer warning of the instability of the 
building, he insisted on television there was no problem and that all workers should 
return to work. The businesses and thousands of workers complied with this directive, with 
horrific consequences.
On April 27, 2014 in Narayanganj, a main industrial area just outside Dhaka, seven 
men went missing, and eventually appeared tied to bags filled with bricks and floating 
in a canal in town. Amongst them were a city councilor and panel mayor in the local 
government, as well as a prominent local lawyer, four aides and a driver. Leading up to 
this tragedy, there were credible threats from a local rival named Nur Hossain, a fellow 
city councilor who had a strong reputation for leading numerous criminal activities. The 
family of the panel mayor, along with a slew of newspapers, alleged that this local rival 
hired members of a government special force named Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) to 
assassinate these individuals, with several RAB members subsequently confessing. Nur 
Hossain, who fled to Calcutta, is anticipated to be extradited back to Bangladesh, though 
at the time of publication, this had not yet occurred.
In Feni district, a primarily rural area 145 kilometers southwest of Dhaka, Phulgazi Upazila 
chairman Ekramul Haq was brutally murdered in broad daylight on May 20, 2014. A 
group of individuals shot at his vehicle, wounding him, while others beat and stabbed 
passengers in the vehicle who tried to flee the scene. Afterwards, the culprits burned the 
vehicle with the chairman inside, who was allegedly still alive.
Police arrested over 20 people as a response to the incident, including Jihad Chowdhury, 
a joint secretary of the Fulgazi upazila unit of the ruling party, and Mahtab Uddin 
Chowdhury Minar, a local opposition party leader. According to news reports, Jihad 
Chowdhury was known for being a drug smuggler, while the individuals who executed 
the murder include criminals known locally for committing robbery, extortion, drug dealing 
and other crimes. 
The common theme to each of these stories is not simply conflict and tragedy. Rather, 
it is the mastaan, a central figure to the local power structure of Bangladesh. The term 
mastaan is used quite broadly within Bangladesh, and loosely translates into ‘strong-
man’, or in some cases, ‘strong-woman’. It usually refers to an individual with stature in 
a community, who uses violence to achieve economic profit and political clout. The term 
is also used regionally; even Bollywood has produced a film entitled ‘Mastaan’, about 
gangsters in India.
2Through writing this book, our main hope is to focus public attention on the role of 
mastaans in Bangladesh, and on the need for a fundamental change. Unfortunately, 
we identify a number of continuing or even worsening trends, such as the violence of 
politics, and the increasing profitability of criminal activities such as land grabbing. There 
is no easy formula for changing these trends, so we do not present a simple list of to 
do items. However, it is time for the public to take a strong stance for law and order in 
the country. Creative solutions are needed to address the current governance crisis, as 
traditional approaches, such as reinforcing the police and court systems, have not yielded 
the necessary results. Such solutions will have to take into account the powerful interests 
involved, which this book describes.  
The Bangladesh Context
This book takes a critical look at mastaans in Bangladesh by addressing several socio-
political trends in Bangladesh: corruption, political violence and the distribution of benefits 
from economic growth. The book is an effort to go into depth regarding the corruption that 
is so endemic to Bangladesh. Of course corruption is not at all exclusive to the country; 39 
nations rate even worse in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
of 2013. However, one would be hard pressed to find a Bangladeshi who does not 
believe corruption is primary impediment to local and national development. Most studies 
of corruption summarize the perceptions of corruption, as well as the lack of checks and 
balances and transparency. However, we hope to inform this dialogue with an analysis of 
the social and economic factors that lead to corruption, including the individuals involved 
and the way in which they operate. Only by understanding the underlying problem can 
we hope to find a solution.
Beyond corruption, this book is also about the violent character of ‘democratic’ politics 
in Bangladesh. In the hartals leading up to the election of January 2014, and repeated 
during the one year anniversary of January 2015, shocking events took place: regular 
citizens, who just happened to dare to travel in an auto rickshaw or a bus on a hartal 
day, were burned alive when protestors set fire to vehicles on the roads. Despite the fact 
that parliamentary elections took place already on January 5, 2014, from January to 
June of 2014, 114 people died and 5,362 were injured due to political violence (ASK, 
2014)1. Frequent events of political violence, and especially those mentioned above, 
have shocked – and are still shocking – the nation. 
Finally, this book is about development and sharing in the recent economic prosperity found 
in Bangladesh, and especially through the control of land. Bangladesh has experienced a 
relatively high level of growth in the economy in recent years, with an average annual GDP 
growth from 2004 to 2013 of 6.2 percent. In this context, control of natural resources and 
land especially, is critical in order to profit from various economic opportunities.
Growth has been fueled by successful industries that depend on an increasing urban 
population, leading to skyrocketing real estate prices in urban areas. Urbanization has 
increased steadily over the last decade.
1 http://www.askbd.org/ask/2014/07/12/incidents-political-violence-first-six-months-2014/
3As seen in Figure 1-1, the urbanization rate in Bangladesh increased from 23.6 percent 
in 2000 to 28.9 percent in 2012, an absolute increase of 5.3 percent, which exceeds all 
countries in the region except Maldives and Bhutan.  
Figure 1-1  Urbanization Rates for South Asian Countries from 2000 to 
2012
Source: World Development Indicators, 2014.  
Along with increasing urbanization comes the increased value to land, whether due to the 
need for housing or space for businesses to operate. Unfortunately, data on the price of 
land or other forms of real estate in Bangladesh is difficult to come by. According to one 
study, the cost of housing rent increased by nearly 3.5 times (247 percent) over a period 
of 17 years; the study also claimed that 70 percent of total housing is rented in Dhaka 
city (Barua et al., 2010). As urbanization increases, and Dhaka becomes amongst the 
fastest growing mega cities in the world, finding housing for the increasing number of 
urban migrants will prove to be a key challenge to overall development. Housing, and 
real estate as a whole, is becoming an increasingly profitable investment in the country.  
However, it is not just urban areas that face a scarcity of land. Bangladesh is well known 
for the high level of population density, at 1,203 people per square kilometer in 2013 
(World Bank, 2014). Also, rural areas have driven economic growth along with urban 
areas. Industries such as shrimp export have taken a strong foothold in the national 
economy, representing nearly 4 percent of GDP. Shrimp farms line the countryside of 
Bangladesh, in areas such as Khulna and Satkhira in the South, and Cox’s Bazar in the 
Southeast of the country. Land is the main input to this industry, which must be situated 
in particular geographical areas for easy access to salt water. While not a focus of this 
book, the large inflow of resources from remittances, and the desire to securely invest 
these funds in land, yields a similar dynamic. The large profit margins involved therefore 
lead to strong competition for land, a topic covered in this book.  
4As a result of these interests, conflicts over land are frequent in Bangladesh. According 
to a study on legal issues in Bangladesh, the most common legal issue faced by the 
Bangladeshi population was property disputes, at 47 percent (Local Government Division, 
2010). Such land conflicts also lead to further crimes, such as violent clashes between 
families.
Corruption, political violence and land conflict might be addressed through a functioning 
justice system. However, the rule of law in Bangladesh is quite weak. As seen in Figure 
1-2, which is based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank, rule 
of law in Bangladesh is relatively poor compared to other South Asian countries. Only 
in Afghanistan is the rule of law substantially worse, while Bangladesh rates marginally 
better than Pakistan. The prevailing weakness of rule of law undermines efforts to address 
the current situation. In this institutional context, the financial interests find fertile ground 
for using different tactics, some violent, to accumulate enormous rents from growth sectors 
such real estate.
Figure 1-2  Measure of Rule of Law for South Asian Countries from 2000 
to 2012
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014.
The Literature on Mastaans
Current research on mastaans mainly emerges from the literature on local power structures 
in Bangladesh.  One of the pioneering books on local power structures was The Net, 
a publication from BRAC in 1980. The Net was a by-product of BRAC’s emergency 
relief program in 1979. In 1979 some northern parts of Bangladesh were experiencing 
drought. A cycle of crop had failed, and due to shortage of food grain poor people were 
experiencing near-starvation situation. BRAC undertook a relief operation to alleviate that 
5shortage by providing extra food. While the operation was underway, a group of four 
field workers decided to document the flow of resources, both internal and external of the 
ten villages. The methodology was simple – enter into conversation with the villagers and 
solicit as much information as possible on resource flow. Later others were interviewed to 
crosscheck the information already obtained. Among the researchers the process became 
known as the ‘gossip’ methodology. 
The Net became the very first documentation and analysis of the rural power structure in 
Bangladesh, and how a web of inter-connected relationships among the prominent rural 
characters deprived the poor of the resources, which were either meant for them or to be 
utilized for the benefit of the public at large. The collusive, and at times, petty criminal 
activities among the prominent players – current and former chairmen and members 
of Union Parishad, influential village faction leaders and followers, food grain ration 
dealers, rich businessmen, union level politicians, ‘dalals’ (side-kicks) and professionals 
- became the invisible net, which successfully diverted various public resources away 
from the poor. The landless and disadvantaged members of the rural community became 
deprived not only of their benefits (e.g., the government Food for Work program) but 
also failed to have access to public resources, such as khas land and forest. The main 
beneficiaries of these crisscrossing lines of collusive, and often criminal, relationship were 
the existing prominent members of various factions in those ten villages of The Net. Over 
a period of time these individuals used their positions of authority advantageously to 
further increase their landholdings, construct better houses, secure power from the rural 
electricity grid system, and generally enhanced their economic and political status in the 
community. Interestingly, however, the role of violence in enforcing these outcomes was 
not prominent, and as such, mastaans did not play a major part in local power structures. 
The Net was also a diagnostic analysis of corruption that existed in rural Bangladesh, 
the first of its kind, and long before such studies gained international prominence in the 
1990s. The collusive relationship among the key players revealed how various public 
resources were used for personal gain. The preface of The Net states, “[T]his study 
gives some indication of the extent of corruption and malpractices that characterizes 
resource distribution in rural Bangladesh and the consequent difficulties of achieving 
development through conventional approaches.” It concludes, “The powerlessness of the 
poor to withstand the machination of the rural elite appears to be the primary constraint to 
development and social change. Without the resolution of the problems of power, genuine 
development in rural Bangladesh will continue to elude us.”
Since this initial research on local power structures, a number of other social studies have 
mentioned the role of mastaans, varying on the types of contexts in which they operate, 
their source of power, and their main economic interests. However, none have sought 
to provide a focused, empirical study of mastaan-ism in Bangladesh. One study of local 
power structures in Bangladesh uses the following description for mastaans:
The presence of mastaans – the term for local strongmen or mafia – is another 
distinctive feature of the power structure in Bangladesh. These individuals play three 
main inter-related roles within local society: first, they form part of the structure of the 
political parties, often overlapping for example with village political leaders; second, 
they are active within the organisations and networks of organised crime, in which 
6their own business interests and those of local politicians often become blurred since 
they use their power and influence to promote and support the careers of activists 
and politicians; and third, they act as intermediaries or brokers in gate-keeping roles 
around access to services such as health and education, police and security, and 
economic facilities such as market-places, land and water resources (Devine 2008). 
(Lewis and Hossain, 2008, p. 17)
As such, the role of mastaans is multi-faceted, including political and criminal, as well as 
brokers to access state goods. A fairly similar definition is used in another study of crime 
in Bangladesh:
Political accumulation involves using their organizational muscle to make money in 
a variety of ways, including capturing government contracts with large margins, 
collecting protection money, organizing social groups including the poor for 
redistributive demands and capturing payoffs from the state or private enterprise 
as ‘mediators’ of these conflicts, appropriating public and private assets that are 
insufficiently protected, and so on. The more notorious political entrepreneurs describe 
themselves as mastaans, but the latter are variants within a wide range of organizers 
who differ only in terms of the level of violence they use, their social respectability and 
the social level they operate at.  (Khan, 2005, p. 24)
Both descriptions of mastaans emphasize their ability to use violence, as well as their 
diverse functions, covering their role in local politics, and their role as an intermediary 
with government. Interestingly, both also observe a potentially positive role of mastaans in 
terms of the mobilization of resources through government – whether in the form of benefits 
or services - for local communities. This latter point is also emphasized in the discussions 
of mastaans by Wood (2003) and Banks (2008), particularly in the urban context. 
In the area of local criminal activities, the versions diverge a bit; while the Lewis and 
Hossain version focuses on their role in organized crime, the Khan version highlights the 
appropriation of public and private assets. This study links these two through a discussion 
of the connection between crime and the appropriation of assets, especially land.
The literature on local power structures faces several limitations, however. First, local 
power structures – and mastaans in particular - have only been studied infrequently in 
the literature. None of these studies has focused primarily on the role of mastaans in the 
locality. As such, while this literature recognizes that mastaans exist in Bangladesh, the 
literature fails to provide a clear description of mastaans, beyond simply mentioning that 
they are involved in different aspects of local political and social life. A more intensive 
and focused study is needed, particularly as The Net was completed in 1981, i.e. over 
30 years ago.
Second, these different accounts provide little empirical evidence to back up their claims 
regarding the role of mastaans, at best providing small examples in the locality. None 
of the literature seeks to study mastaans across cases and contexts, and certainly not 
throughout the nation. In contrast, this book analyzes a variety of data, providing a study 
of mastaans who are viewed through different lenses.
7The Main Questions and Themes of the Book
The book seeks to provide a structured study that answers several questions related to 
mastaan-ism in a wide variety of contexts, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
The questions include the following:
1. What economic interests have become the focuses of local criminal 
activities?  
A number of potential areas of profit are mentioned in the literature described above. The 
book will explore these areas of profit, seeking to measure the opportunities that are the 
most prevalent and profitable for the individuals involved.
2. Who is involved in pursuing these interests?
Through both quantitative and qualitative evidence, the book seeks to describe the precise 
individuals who participate in these particular local criminal activities, as well as the way 
in which different actors are allied. The mastaans perhaps lead these efforts, or they 
may work for politicians or businesses in committing crimes for personal profit. The study 
will also attempt to document the main victims of these crimes, whether political rivals or 
disempowered poor or others. Those victims may seek to fight against these interests using 
a variety of strategies.
3. How are those interests pursued?
The book inquires as to the process by which mastaans and others complete their criminal 
activities. The process may include the use of violence at the local level, a defining feature 
of mastaans. However, the process might also include negotiation and relationship 
building with local allies.
4. Who is involved in illegal election-related activities, such as patronage 
and political violence?
While the literature mentions the importance of mastaans in both of these activities, there 
are many individuals who may be involved in distributing benefits to political supporters.
5. How do illegal election-related activities work?
The book will attempt to provide insight into criminal activity related to elections, especially 
electoral violence. It provides stories of such violence in different contexts, including the 
damage done and the reaction from the police in the locality.
Methodology and Research Design
Given the often-secretive nature of mastaan activities, the topic is challenging to investigate. 
As a result, our research team used different approaches to study the mastaans, mixing 
both quantitative and qualitative methods and leveraging a variety of information sources. 
Unfortunately, systematic and nationally representative data is not available on mastaans, 
particular given that their activities are often context specific and secretive. Also due to 
8limited time and funds, our research cannot provide clear and ‘statistically significant’ 
measures of mastaan activities throughout Bangladesh.  
The qualitative and quantitative methodologies have distinct advantages. The qualitative 
method details the mechanisms that bridge the causes and outcomes. Next, and related 
to this point, is that the qualitative methodology captures features of the causes that are 
difficult to measure using quantitative techniques. The quantitative approach, on the other 
hand, allows for a larger number of areas covered in the survey, and a larger sample 
of respondents. Our research experience also presented another distinct advantage to 
the survey approach: those respondents were much more willing to answer openly to an 
anonymous questionnaire than respond to an individual interview.
The three empirical chapters of this book analyze different sources of data, as follows. 
Chapter two uses original data developed from a survey of 340 journalists in seven 
constituencies, each randomly selected from one of the seven divisions of Bangladesh. The 
cases represent a variety of contexts in Bangladesh, including rural and urban, coastal, 
border and interior, with both growing and stagnant economies, and in constituencies 
where the current ruling party and the traditional opposition party have been in power 
in recent times. The resulting data is used for a basic statistical analysis, covering such 
topics as the main crimes for profit committed, and the main actors participating in these 
crimes; the frequency of and damage from electoral violence, and the individuals involved 
in organizing such actions; the main forms of patronage in the constituencies, and actors 
controlling such patronage; and the characteristics of the most powerful mastaan in the 
constituency.
Chapter three, meanwhile, presents a basic statistical analysis of data from MP asset 
declaration forms. Although this data is deeply flawed, it suggests interesting insights 
into wealth of MPs. It combines data from 2008 and 2013, allowing a comparison for 
approximately half of parliamentarians of before and after their term in the 9th Parliament 
of 2009-2013. The forms present a variety of variables, including income from different 
sources, financial assets, land, and gold. The forms also offer data on the educational 
level of MPs, and criminal cases against them.
Chapter four conducts case studies of two constituencies, using a qualitative methodology. 
The chapter presents case studies of two constituencies found in the survey, and focuses on the 
mechanics of land grabbing and political violence. Our team identified the two constituencies 
because of the strong presence and power of mastaans, based on data from the survey. The 
case studies provide more qualitative information on land grabbing and political violence, 
including the actors involved and the context in which they occur. The qualitative information 
therefore illustrates the points emerging from the survey in chapter two.
Main Themes and Outline of the Book
Several broad conclusions emerge from the research. First, mastaans play a major role in 
the local socio political life across the variety of cases presented in this research. Their role, 
however, generally focuses on two areas: crimes for profit and electoral violence, and not 
patronage. Within crimes for profit, they are especially involved in land grabbing, drug 
9dealing and extortion, which for the most part are the three most common and profitable 
crimes for profit at the local level in our study areas.  
Second, there is some notable variation across cases. One distinct area of variation is 
the level of mastaan power. While they hold some influence across the cases, they are 
much more powerful in the two case study areas scrutinized in chapter 4, than in the 
other five areas covered in the study.  Such variation is not recognized in the literature on 
mastaan-ism in Bangladesh thus far, due to the limited research at the local level on the 
topic. There is also an enormous variation in MP wealth, as well as the increases in MP 
wealth over time.  
Third, putting insights from the three chapters together, this book develops a hypothesis 
to explain the level of mastaan power and increases in MP wealth that depends on the 
economy of the locality. Chapter 2 suggests that mastaan power varies across cases. 
Chapter 3 suggests that in a relatively small portion of constituencies, the wealth of MPs 
has increased dramatically, while in others there has been little increase. Chapter 4 looks 
at the context of constituencies in which mastaan power is greatest, and finds that the 
economic opportunities are unique in these contexts, with local actors using mastaan 
power in order to exploit those opportunities. In the Case 1 area, a peri urban area 
of Dhaka, there was an enormous need for housing, leading both local and national 
companies to work with the local power structure to grab land to acquire real estate for 
housing development. The Case 2 area had a prosperous shrimp farming industry that 
relies on land in particular zones; as a result, local interests used strong-arm techniques 
to capture shrimp farms. These growth areas fostered an unprecedented profitability of 
land investment, leading to strong-arm tactics often led by local politicians to grab land. 
Such interests using violence flourished in the context of weak institutions and rule of law.
The use of mastaan power is correlated with the extensive use of violence in local politics 
as well, such as murder and mass beatings. In some instances, the same local actors were 
clearly involved in both of the areas, the economic and political; these actors tended to be 
local politicians such as UP chairmen. Due to the secretive nature of the activities, though, 
it was difficult to establish the precise involvement of higher-level politicians, such as the 
Upazila chairs and the MPs. Local informants, when not afraid to speak, insisted that they 
were involved and even directing many of these activities.
The book proceeds as follows. Chapter two examines the areas of economic crimes 
and illegal political activities in Bangladesh where politicians, mastaans and others 
are involved. It is based on a survey of 340 journalists in seven constituencies found 
throughout the country. It makes the following main observations. The most common and 
profitable forms of crime for profit are land grabbing and drug dealing, with politicians 
and mastaans heavily involved in both. As relates to electoral activities, the main areas 
of illegal activities here include political violence and patronage. The most common form 
of patronage includes the distribution of benefits from the Vulnerable Group Development 
Program and the Vulnerable Group Feeding Program; though politicians control this 
patronage, along with the administration and student and youth leaders, mastaans are 
usually not involved. Meanwhile, demonstrations occurred in all constituencies during 
the lead up to the recent elections, with injuries resulting from clashes in these events. 
Politicians and mastaans, along with student and youth leaders, were most commonly 
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involved in electoral violence.  The specific characteristics of mastaans include the following 
across the cases. Some mastaans are elected to public office, but more frequently they 
hold official positions in political parties, and they almost always hold a strong link to a 
politician.
Chapter three presents the results of an analysis of asset declaration forms of Members 
of Parliament of Bangladesh from 2008 and 2013, focusing on the 300 territorial MPs. 
Our hypothesis is that, if politicians are broadly involved in criminal activities, their assets 
should increase markedly while in power. While noting that this data is highly flawed, 
the chapter makes the following observations. First, across the board, there are dramatic 
increases in the income and assets of MPs from 2008 to 2013, whether financial assets, 
land, gold or income. The distribution of income and assets per MP, as well as growth 
in assets, is highly skewed to the wealthiest MPs. Also, the analysis divided MPs into 
two groups, MPs re-elected in 2014 and other MPs, showing that the groups generally 
experienced comparable increases in wealth over time, with some variation. The number of 
MPs with criminal charges, and the total number of criminal charges for parliamentarians, 
has declined between 2008 and 2013. The large increases in wealth – whether income, 
financial assets, land or gold – raise important questions as to the source of the increases, 
suggesting a possible role for mastaan-like activities explored in other chapters.
Chapter four presents case studies of two constituencies, a peri-urban area in Dhaka 
Division and a mainly rural, costal area in Khulna Division. These case studies focus on 
the dynamics of land grabbing and political violence, making the following observations. 
First, a culture of fear prevails in the two case study areas, among both journalists and the 
local population. Second, the cases highlight how the prosperous industries of housing 
in one case and shrimp farming in the other lead to a premium on land that motivates 
extreme tactics to grab land, often violence. Third, land owners who are at risk of land 
grabbing may organize and, if conditions are right, successfully halt land grabbing; such 
organizing occurs less frequently with khas land in the case studies, however, putting that 
land at greater risk. Fourth, political violence is committed on both sides of the political 
divide; these cases highlight that mastaanism and party supporters, especially in the 
student and youth leagues, overlap substantially.  
The conclusion, chapter five, summarizes the findings of the research and discusses the 
implications of the research for Bangladesh, especially a renewed focus on local law and 
order in Bangladesh. It also makes recommendations for further research, advocating for 
creative approaches to improving the rule of law.
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2. Politicians, Mastaans and Governance: 
A Survey of Journalists on Local Power 
Structures
Introduction
This chapter analyzes the nexus of politicians, mastaans and others who are involved in a 
variety of criminal activities, including crimes for profit, patronage and electoral violence. 
While news stories abound with tales of politicians and mastaans committing a variety 
of illegal acts in their localities, the topic has not been a focus of a structured analysis, 
despite a variety of case studies emerging. As a result, it is difficult to determine the 
relevance of such a nexus in a variety of contexts in Bangladesh, as well as the prevalence 
of these events and the precise actors involved.  
This chapter presents the results of a survey of 340 journalists in seven randomly selected 
constituencies, one for each division of Bangladesh. As such, it covers a diversity of 
contexts found in Bangladesh: rural and urban, coastal, border and interior, with both 
growing and stagnant economies, and with constituencies in which both the current ruling 
party and the traditional opposition party have been in power in recent times.  
The survey particularly probes the following topics in each of the constituencies:
•  The main crimes for profit committed, and the main actors participating in these 
crimes
•  The frequency of and damage from electoral violence, and the individuals involved 
in organizing such actions
•  The main forms of patronage in the constituencies, and actors controlling such 
patronage
•  The characteristics of the most powerful mastaan in the constituency
Based on an analysis of the survey results, the chapter makes the following cross-cutting 
observations, with some regional variation. First, the most common and profitable forms 
of crime for profit are land grabbing and drug dealing. Politicians and mastaans are 
heavily involved in land grabbing, while politicians, the police and mastaans dominate 
drug dealing in the constituencies. Land that is grabbed is most commonly khas land, i.e. 
government owned land. When such land is taken, it is generally used for shops, though 
there was some regional variation. As relates to electoral activities, the main areas of 
illegal activities here include political violence and patronage. The most common forms 
of patronage include the distribution of benefits from the Vulnerable Group Development 
Program (VGD) and the Vulnerable Group Feeding Program (VGF). Although respondents 
generally state that politicians, the administration and student and youth leaders are 
involved in these efforts, the survey suggests that mastaans generally are not. Meanwhile, 
demonstrations generally occurred somewhere between once a month and twice a 
week in all constituencies during the lead up to the recent elections; the demonstrations 
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often become fierce, though with few grievous injuries or deaths resulting from electoral 
violence. Politicians and mastaans, along with student and youth leaders, were most 
commonly involved in electoral violence. The specific characteristics of mastaans include 
the following across the cases. Some mastaans are elected to public office, but more 
frequently they hold official positions in political parties, and they almost always hold a 
strong link to a politician.
Method and Design:
The survey covered a number of topics regarding politics, electoral violence, mastaans, 
crime and patronage. The questions were structured, with multiple choice answers, 
with a small number of open ended questions. The survey was presented in Bangla to 
respondents.
The data gathered for this chapter was compiled using a survey of local journalists in 
seven constituencies. The survey was not nationally representative, meaning that the 
conclusions are not generalizable to all of Bangladesh. Our funding and timing did not 
allow for such a comprehensive survey to be conducted. Instead, the cases selected offer 
insight into a variety of cases, capturing the diverse contexts found within Bangladesh.
Our selection of cases sought to balance three criteria.  First, we wanted our selection to be 
unbiased to ensure the integrity of the study. Second, we wanted to ensure representation 
from different areas of Bangladesh, which has a diverse set of geographies, socio 
economic situations and cultures. Third, we sought to capture political representation, to 
observe how the actions of power brokers might cross the division of political parties, or 
even possibly differ. 
We therefore took a mostly randomly selected single constituency from each of the seven 
divisions of Bangladesh.2 The random selection allowed for an unbiased approach, given 
that our researchers were not previously familiar with the locality. However, each site 
was not completely randomly selected. In one division, we rejected several of the first 
selections to ensure that the constituency was represented by the opposition party in 
the Ninth Parliament (2009-2013). Also, for two divisions, we rejected the first result. 
In Chittagong, we at first selected the constituency of Chittagong 2, whose MP, Salah 
Uddin Quader Chowdhury, had just been indicted by the International Crimes Tribunal 
in Bangladesh in October of 2013, which would greatly enhance the local sensitivities to 
such research. The other constituency we rejected was Gopalganj 3 in Dhaka Division, 
whose MP is Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, which is also a sensitive and extraordinarily 
unique case. In Rangpur, we rejected several different cases to find an appropriate case 
with single party rule, as the other slots had been filled.
The seven constituencies represent a total of 13 upazilas, though in one case, the 
constituency formed only one of two constituencies in an upazila. 
2 To complete the random selection, a series of random numbers were generated in excel that each represented 
a constituency in the division. 
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In presenting the results, we decided to keep the cases anonymous, referring to them only 
by the division in which they are found, with some general contextual information. We 
did so for two main reasons. First, we feel that the social dynamics are not necessarily 
unique to each case and instead represent socio political structures that operate in many 
areas of Bangladesh. We therefore focus our attention on these structures, and not on 
the particular individuals and their actions. In other words, we are not in the business of 
doing ‘gotcha’ journalism. Second, given that we are describing the allegedly criminal 
activities of many powerful individuals, we hoped to preclude a reaction from them 
towards our key informants as well as ourselves. Many of these individuals are accused 
of committing serious infractions of the law, and are allegedly involved routinely in acts 
of strong violence.
Survey was conducted from February to June of 2014. The journalists were gathered via 
the local press club. The journalists were contacted by a local journalist hired by our team 
to arrange the facility, and conducted in a single location by all journalists present.  
Survey Sites: Seven Constituencies
The survey sites include seven constituencies, one for each division of Bangladesh. They 
are not just geographically diverse, but also differ in terms of population and population 
density. 
Table 2-1 Survey Location Populations and Population Densities
Case Name by Division
Population
2011
Population Density
per sq km, 2011
1 Dhaka Constituency* 794,000* 4,760*
2 Sylhet Constituency 233,000 1,094
3 Chittagong Constituency 522,000 2,203
4 Rangpur Constituency 312,000 1,130
5 Rajshahi Constituency 379,000 1,203
6 Khulna Constituency 137,000 94
7 Barishal Constituency 261,000 575
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Annual Census, 2012.
Note: as constituency data is not available, the data for the Dhaka constituency includes 
that of the upazila, in which two constituencies are found. As such, the population 
is much larger, though the density should be approximately accurate.
The cases selected are quite diverse. Table 2-1 presents basic information on population 
and population density. While electoral laws limit the range of population for each 
constituency, they still vary from 137,000 in the constituency of Khulna division to 
522,000 for the constituency in Chittagong division. Meanwhile, population density 
also shows very large differences. The Khulna constituency, found along the coast of 
14
Bangladesh with a large Sundarbans (mangrove forest) area and numerous islands, has 
a much smaller population density at 94 inhabitants per square kilometer than the Dhaka 
constituency, which borders Dhaka city and has an approximate population density of 
4,760 people per square kilometer.
Table 2-2 Survey Location Descriptions
Case Name by 
Division
Description
Other
Characteristics
Economic Activity
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Borders Dhaka 
City
Small commerce, 
small scale garment 
production
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Large outward 
migration
Remittances plus services
3 Chittagong Constituency
Semi Rural/ 
Border
Border town Commerce
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural Agriculture
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural Agriculture
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal Near to the coast
Agriculture, shrimp 
farming
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural Agriculture
Respondents
The target audience for the survey was professional journalists from the locality. These 
journalists were all members of the local Upazila press club. In order to cover the full 
constituency, our team often conducted a series of survey sessions in each Upazila of 
the constituency. Our team contacted the journalists via a local journalist, who was hired 
in order to handle these logistics. As seen in Table 2-3, the vast majority of the local 
journalists attended the survey session, with only a handful missing in each case. A more 
complete description of the process of contacting and gathering journalists for the survey 
is provided in Annex 3.1.
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Table 2-3 Number of Journalist Respondents in Each Constituency
Case Name by 
Division
Description
Number of Journalist 
Respondents
Total Registered 
Journalists
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 24 31
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 52 53 
3 Chittagong Constituency
Semi Rural/ 
Border
51 53 
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 93 95 
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 19 21 
6 Khulna Constituency
Rural/ 
Coastal
47 51 
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 54 59 
We chose journalists as the primary source of information as they 1. have detailed 
knowledge of events in the area; 2. are more likely to be objective observers than are the 
actual subjects of the survey (primarily politicians and mastaans); 3. are easily accessible 
and identifiable; 4. are present in constituencies throughout the country. 
Table 2-4 Average Years Working as a Journalist Among Respondents
Case Name by Division Description Average Years as Journalist
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 14.9
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 8.7
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 15.4
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 11.4
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 14.6
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 12.1
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 11.9
Journalists exhibited a range of characteristics. Some had just started their work several 
months before the survey, while others had several decades of experience. Table 2-4 
shows the average number of years of experience among each group of journalists. The 
responses range from 8.7 to 15.4 years of experience, suggesting a substantial time that 
most of the respondents had worked as journalists. The vast majority of respondents were 
male, with just a handful of female journalists having attended the survey sessions.
The use of journalists presents a number of potential biases to the research. First, while 
attempting to capture reality, the survey is primarily perceptions-based.  There is no certainty 
that the journalists are themselves objective observers. During consultations regarding the 
survey, senior journalists themselves pointed out a common practice whereby journalists 
provide favorable coverage to politicians in exchange for payment. Our case studies 
illustrate that journalists are also fearful of politicians and other mastaans, who may seek 
retribution for negative press. Journalists also tend to be based in semi urban areas, and 
thus may not be as aware of people and events in rural areas.
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Crime in the Constituency
Table 2-5 Rating of General Law and Order Situation in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Average Score (1-5)
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 3.6
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 3.4
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 3.2
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 3.2
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 3.4
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 3.4
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 3.2
Note: Options for Crime: 1 = Never Happens, 2= Not Frequent, 3 = Manageable, 4 = 
Bad, 5 = Very Bad.
In general, journalists felt that the general law and order situation was somewhere between 
manageable and frequent in each of their constituencies. Table 2-5 provides an average 
rating from journalists, showing surprisingly little variation. Each answer ranged from 3.2 
to 3.6, where 3.0 means that law and order was ‘manageable’ and 4.0 means ‘bad’.  
Crime for Profit
Crime comes in numerous forms, but the form that is most relevant for mastaan activity 
relates to what we term crime for profit. In other words, mastaans generally seek to use 
their muscle for economic gain.  
Table 2-6 Most Common Forms of Crime for Profit in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Forms of Crime for Profit
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Land grabbing (95.8%)
Drug Dealing (79.2%)
Extortion (45.8%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Land grabbing (90.4%)
Drug Dealing (69.2%)
Theft (69.2%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border
Land grabbing (92.2%)
Drug Dealing (78.4%)
Drug Smuggling (72.5%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Drug Dealing (76.3%)
Drug Smuggling (71.0%)
Land grabbing (54.8%)
17
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Drug Dealing (94.7%)
Drug Smuggling (68.4%)
Theft (68.4%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Land grabbing (87.2%)
Drug Dealing (61.7%)
Extortion (57.4%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Land grabbing (74.1%)
Drug Dealing (72.2%)
Theft (59.3%)
Note: Options included Land Grabbing, Drug Dealing, Drug Smuggling, Extortion, Theft, 
Garment Leftovers, Arms Smuggling and Violence for Hire.
Note: The percent indicates the portion of journalists who recognized the area of crime 
as among the top three most common in the constituency.
The evidence suggests that the most common areas of crime for profit across constituencies 
include land grabbing and drug dealing. Table 2-6 summarizes the areas recognized by 
the journalists as being among the top three most common in each constituency. The 
percent represents a degree of confidence in terms of consensus among journalists, where 
a very high percentage may be interpreted as a strong consensus among journalists. 
Other common forms of crime include theft, extortion and drug smuggling in the 
constituency. Journalists were provided with an ‘other’ option in their answers, but they 
rarely mentioned alternative forms of crime, with the exception of the shrimp farms in the 
constituency in Khulna division. 
Table 2-7 Most Profitable Forms of Crime for Profit in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Forms of Crime for Profit
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Land grabbing (95.8%)
Drug Dealing (91.7%)
Extortion (50.0%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Land Grabbing (84.6%)
Drug Dealing (57.7%)
Theft (65.4%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border
Land Grabbing (94.1%)
Drug Smuggling (86.5%)
Drug Dealing (82.4%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Drug Dealing (91.4%)
Drug Smuggling (72.0%)
Extortion (59.1%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Drug Dealing (84.2%)
Drug Smuggling (68.4%)
Land Grabbing (57.9%)
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6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Land Grabbing (89.4%)
Drug Dealing (72.3%)
Extortion (59.6%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Land Grabbing (90.7%)
Drug Dealing (64.8%)
Extortion (59.3%)
Note: Options included Land Grabbing, Drug Dealing, Drug Smuggling, Extortion, Theft, 
Garment Leftovers, Arms Smuggling and Violence for Hire.
Journalists most commonly cited land grabbing and drug dealing as being the most 
profitable forms of crime. Table 2-7 summarizes the results in which journalists were asked 
to name the top three most profitable forms of crime for profit. These results were broadly 
similar to the results in Table 2-6, which were focused on the frequency and not profitability 
of the crimes. It suggests that there are little constraining criminals from earning profit from 
their crimes, as the most profitable crimes are almost universally the most frequent. In other 
words, when crimes are profitable, lawbreakers are able to commit the crimes.    
Table 2-8 Frequency of the Land Grabbing Compared to Other Areas of 
Bangladesh
Case Name by Division Description Average Score (1-5)
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 3.52
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 3.08
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 3.77
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 2.86
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 3.00
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 3.40
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 3.51
Note: 1 = Never, 2 = Infrequent, 3 = Somewhat Frequent, 4 = Frequent, 5 = Very 
Frequent.
In each of the cases, the respondents answered that, when compared to other areas 
of Bangladesh, land grabbing occurred at least somewhat often. Table 2-8 summarizes 
the average score given by journalists in terms of the frequency of land grabbing when 
considering the perceived rate in the rest of Bangladesh. The average score from 
respondents ranged from 2.86 (nearly somewhat frequent) to 3.77 (nearly frequent) in 
the Chittagong constituency. In no case did it never happen, or was it very frequent. 
19
Table 2-9 Frequency of the Drug Dealing Compared to Other Areas of 
Bangladesh
Case Name by Division Description Average Score (1-5)
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 3.23
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 3.31
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 3.68
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 3.54
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 3.07
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 3.32
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 2.82
Note: 1 = Never, 2 = Infrequent, 3 = Somewhat Frequent, 4 = Frequent, 5 = Very 
Frequent.
Overall, drug dealing occurs in each of the case constituencies fairly frequently when 
compared to other areas of Bangladesh. Table 2-9 indicates the average scores given by 
journalists when estimating the perceived frequency of drug dealing in their constituency 
in comparison to the rest of Bangladesh. The estimates range from 2.82 (nearly somewhat 
frequent) in the Barisal constituency to 3.68 (approaching frequent) in the Chittagong 
constituency. As such, they are indicative of a moderate frequency in all the case study 
areas.   
Table 2-10 Top Three Individuals Involved in Drug Dealing in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Types of People Involved
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban Politician (84.6%)
Police, mastaan (76.9%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Police (82.8%)
Politician (69.0%)
Mastaan, Community leader (41.4%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border
Police (75.9%)
Politician (65.5%)
Mastaan (62.1.7%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Police (67.2%)
Politician (57.4%)
Mastaan (50.8%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Police (78.6%)
Politician (57.1%)
Mastaan (42.9%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Politician (68.2%)
Police (50.0%)
Mastaan (54.5%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (60.7%)
Police (53.6%)
Mastaan (46.4%)
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Note: Options included government official, business person, mastaan, professional 
group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.), politician, police, large landowner, 
non-political community leader, media professional, student/ youth leader, labor 
leader, non-political religious group, others. 
In every case, journalists estimated that the most involved individuals in the drug trade 
include politicians, police and mastaans. Table 2-10 presents the percentage of journalists 
who, when identifying the drug trade as one of three most common crimes in their area, also 
recognized the types of individuals who participate in the trade. In the Sylhet constituency, 
the same percentage of journalists identified the community leaders and the mastaans as 
involved in the drug trade. This data suggests that there is a strong involvement among 
these groups in the conduct of the drug trade, and presents the possibility that they indeed 
cooperate in the trade.
A Focus on Land Grabbing
Table 2-11 Most Common Types of Land Grabbed in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Forms of Land Grabbed
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Khas land (83.3%)
Small farmer land (58.3%)
Vested property (33.3%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Khas land (74.5%)
Fallow land (49.0%)
Char land (37.3%)
3 Chittagong Constituency
Semi Rural/ 
Border
Khas land (80.4%)
Vested property (52.9%)
Gov’t department land (41.2%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Khas land (92.5%)
Char land (69.9%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Khas land (79.0%)
Fallow land (52.6%)
Wetlands (36.8%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Khas land (91.2%)
Char land (72.3%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Khas land (96.3%)
Char land (66.7%)
Note: Options of types of land include: khas land, char land, small farmer, unused 
private urban land, fallow land, large farmer land, vested property (related to 
minorities), wetlands, migrant lands, government department lands, others.
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By far, the journalists cited khas land as the most commonly grabbed land in their 
constituency. Table 2-11 summarizes the results of journalist views on land grabbing. Khas 
land is defined as government owned land that is not utilized. Journalists also recognize 
char land as being prone to capture. Char lands are masses of land that often break off 
into the river, reforming to bordering land further downstream. Not all constituencies have 
char land, however, which presents the possibility of variation. Journalists also recognize 
fallow land, vested property,3 and wetlands as being prone to capture. 
Table 2-12 Most Common Uses of Land Grabbed in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Uses of Grabbed Land
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Housing (95.8%)
Shops (87.5%)
Factories (50.0%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Shops (82.4%)
Agriculture (56.9%)
Housing (49.0%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border
Shops (92.2%)
Housing (70.6%)
Factories (43.1%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Shops (77.4%)
Agriculture (72.0%)
Fish pond (66.7%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Shops (84.2%)
Housing (47.4%)
Agriculture (47.4%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Fish ponds (100.0%)
Shops (70.2%)
Agriculture (42.6%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Shops (87.0%)
Fish ponds (57.4%)
Housing (50.0%)
Note: Options of uses for grabbed land include: agriculture, fish pond, housing, shops, 
factories, mosque or other religious institution, nothing, other.
The most commonly cited use of grabbed land is shops, with housing also mentioned 
frequently. Table 2-12 presents the percentage of journalists who identify the ways in which 
grabbed land is used. Shops top the list in five of the seven constituencies, while housing 
appear in the top three list of five different constituencies, and agriculture appears in three 
such lists. In the Dhaka constituency, housing appears as number one; this may be due to 
the fact that the constituency is a peri-urban area experiencing large increases in population 
due to urbanization. In the Khulna constituency, the most universally agreed use of land in is 
fishponds, where every journalist agreed that grabbed land is used in this way. 
3 Vested property is defined as property belonging to individuals deemed to be an enemy of the state and often 
used against Hindu minorities to confiscate their land
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Table 2-13 Top Three Individuals Involved in Land Grabbing in the 
Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Types of People Involved
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Politician (87.5%)
Youth leader (62.5%)
Mastaan (58.3%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (86.3%)
Community leader, youth leader, 
mastaan (49.0%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border
Politician (80.4%)
Mastaan (70.6%)
Community leader (49.0%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Politician (73.9%)
Mastaan (54.3%)
Gov’t official (43.5%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Politician (78.9%)
Mastaan (63.2%)
Police (36.8%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Politician (93.6%)
Mastaan (61.7%)
Gov’t official (48.9%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (85.2%)
Mastaan (66.7%)
Gov’t official (61.1%)
Note: Options included government official, business person, mastaan, professional 
group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.), politician, police, large landowner, 
non-political community leader, media professional, student/ youth leader, labor 
leader, non-political religious group, others. 
The most recognized types of individuals perceived to be involved in land grabbing 
include politicians and mastaans. Table 2-13 presents the top three selections of journalists 
in the constituencies in terms of groups who participate in grabbing land. In every case, 
the politicians are the most recognized individual, which likely relates to the fact that khas 
land is most commonly grabbed. Mastaans are similarly identified in their role in land 
grabbing, appearing as a top choice in each constituency. Other types of individuals 
that journalists choose include government officials, community and youth leaders and 
the police.  
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Elections in the Constituency
One focus of the research is to explore the relationship between mastaans and politics, 
including political violence. Beyond broad perceptions, we therefore inquired into the 
dynamics of the elections of January 2014; however, this was a unique election given that 
the main opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party, boycotted the elections. The 
survey therefore included questions focused on the 2008 election.
Table 2-14 Most Common Ways that Politicians Reward People for their 
Political Support
Case Name by Division Description Forms of Patronage
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
VGD/ VGF Distribution (66.7%)
Access to marketplace (54.2%)
Government contracts (41.7%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
VGD/ VGF Distribution (37.3%)
Gov’t contracts (29.4%)
Public employment (29.4%)
3 Chittagong Constituency
Semi Rural/ 
Border
Gov’t contracts (72.5%)
VGD/ VGF Distribution (40.0%)
Public employment (37.5%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Gov’t contracts (49.5%)
VGD/ VGF Distribution (47.3%)
SMC position/ college management 
position (44.0%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
VGD/ VGF Distribution (68.4%)
SMC position/ college management 
position (42.1%)
Food for Work (42.1%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
VGD/ VGF Distribution (63.0%)
Khas land/ wetlands access (47.8%)
Security from police (39.1%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
VGD/ VGF Distribution (57.4%)
Public employment (42.6%)
Food for work (46.3%)
Note: Options include: VGF/VGD distribution, government contracts, SMC position/ 
college management position, food for work program, fertilizer and seed 
distribution, khas land/ wetlands access, security from police, access to market 
areas/ lease of market place, other safety net programs, controlling transport 
business, private employment, public employment, other. 
Politicians use a number of tactics to reward their supporters, but the most commonly 
cited one is the distribution of benefits from the Vulnerable Group Development Program 
(VGD) and the Vulnerable Group Feeding Program (VGF). Table 2-14 presents the 
three most common choices from journalists when asked about the top three ways that 
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politicians compensate their supporters. While VGF/ VGD distribution appears in each 
of the constituencies, other commonly cited rewards are government contracts, public 
employment and food for work.
Table 2-15 Top Three Individuals Involved in the VGD/ VGF distribution as 
a Reward for Political Support
Case Name by Division Description Types of People Involved
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Politician (68.8%)
Student Leader (62.5%)
Mastaan (50.0%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (82.1%)
Gov’t Official (57.1%)
Student/ Youth Leader (50.0%)
3 Chittagong Constituency
Semi Rural/ 
Border
Politician (90.3%)
Gov’t Official (51.6%)
Student/ Youth Leader (51.6%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Politician (88.9%)
Gov’t Official (60.0%)
Student/ Youth Leader (51.1%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Politician (92.3%)
Gov’t Official (61.5%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Politician (90.0%)
Gov’t Official (63.3%)
Mastaan, Student/ Youth Leader 
(46.7%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (90.9%)
Gov’t Official (54.5%)
Student/ Youth Leader (60.6%)
Note: Options included government official, business person, mastaan, professional 
group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.), politician, police, large landowner, 
non-political community leader, media professional, student/ youth leader, labor 
leader, non-political religious group, others. 
The main types of individuals who participate in the distribution of VGD and VGF benefits 
as a form of patronage include politicians, government officials and student or youth 
leaders. Table 2-15 summarizes the top three individuals involved, with the percentage 
of journalists identifying them as such in the right column. Mastaans only appear in the 
Dhaka and Khulna constituencies as among the top three individuals. This suggests that in 
most constituencies, mastaans do not play a major role in supporting politicians in terms 
of bolstering their patronage networks. 
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Table 2-16 Top Three Individuals Involved in Government Contracts as a 
Reward for Political Support
Case Name by Division Description Types of People Involved
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Politician (80.0%)
Student/ youth leader (60.0%)
Government official (50.0%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (91.4%)
Gov’t Official (74.3%)
Student/ Youth Leader (62.9%)
3 Chittagong Constituency
Semi Rural/ 
Border
Politician (88.5%)
Student/ Youth Leader (57.7%)
Gov’t Official (46.2%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Politician (92.0%)
Gov’t Official (62.0%)
Student/ Youth Leader (62.0%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Politician (85.7%)
Gov’t Official (85.7%)
Mastaan (42.9%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Politician (90.0%)
Gov’t Official (55.0%)
Student/ Youth Leader (65.0%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (85.2%)
Gov’t Official (59.2%)
Student/ Youth Leader (59.3%)
Note: Options included government official, business person, mastaan, professional 
group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.), politician, police, large landowner, 
non-political community leader, media professional, student/ youth leader, labor 
leader, non-political religious group, others. 
Similar to VGD/ VGF distribution, the main types of individuals who participate in 
distributing government contracts as a reward for political support include politicians, 
government officials and student leaders. Table 2-16 summarizes the top three categories 
in terms of the percentage of journalists who identify them as performing this role. 
Mastaans again do not appear prominently in this list, placing in the top three only 
in Rajshahi constituency; meanwhile, 45 percent of journalists in the Khulna case and 
52 percent in the Rangpur case name mastaans as being involved in the distribution of 
government contracts as patronage. As such, the results do not exclude the possibility 
of their importance in this means of rewarding political supporters. One reason that 
student and youth leaders appear may be that they receive government contracts, but then 
re-distribute them for profit. Such were the alleged activities of prominent political youth 
leaders Riazul Haque Khan Milky – a recent murder victim - and Jahid Siddique Tarek – 
the prime accused in the murder.
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Political Violence
Table 2-17  Frequency of Demonstration in Three Months Prior to 2014 
Election
Case Name by Division Description Average Estimate
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 2.67
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 2.75
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 3.03
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 3.03
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 2.68
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 2.87
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 2.69
Note: 1 = Almost Never, 2 = Once or Twice a Month, 3 = Once or Twice a Week, 4 = 
Several Times a Week.
In each constituency, demonstrations occurred in the lead up to the election in January 
of 2014. Table 2-17 presents the average estimates by journalists of the number of 
demonstrations in their constituency in the three months prior to the election. The averages 
ranged between two (demonstrations occurred once or twice a month) and just above 
three (demonstrations occurred once or twice a week). As a result, demonstrations took 
place consistently over the period of elections. One should keep in mind, however, that 
there were also demonstrations related to the International Crimes Tribunal. Whether 
these demonstrations might be considered as political is a matter of debate.  
Table 2-18  Frequency of Violent Demonstrations in the Three Months Prior 
to 2014 Election
Case Name by Division Description Average Estimate
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 2.54
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 2.31
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 2.65
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 2.57
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 2.89
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 2.53
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 2.19
Note: 1 = Almost Never, 2 = Once or Twice a Month, 3 = Once or Twice a Week, 4 = 
Several Times a Week.
Journalists perceived that the demonstrations frequently turned violent in each of the 
constituencies. Table 2-18 presents the average estimates by journalists of the number of 
violent demonstrations in the three months prior to the election. In each case, journalists 
on average rated the frequency between two (once or twice a month) and three (once or 
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twice a week). Again, the violent demonstrations may have related to the announcements 
of the International Crimes Tribunal.
Table 2-19  Number of Individuals Killed in Electoral Violence Prior to 
2014 Election
Case Name by Division Description Average Estimate
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 0
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 0.02
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 0.13
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 0.35
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 0.79
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 0.19
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 0
The average estimate of people who died as a result of electoral violence was low in most 
cases. Table 2-19 summarizes the average estimate of the number of individuals killed 
during the electoral violence in the lead up to the 2014 election. None of these exceeded 
1, and in only a single case did the number exceed 0.25, in the Rajshahi constituency. As 
such, while there were numerous violent demonstrations, they rarely turned lethal.
Table 2-20  Top Three Individuals Involved in Electoral Violence Prior to 
2014 Election
Case Name by Division Description Types of People Involved
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Politician (83.3%)
Student/ Youth leader (62.5%)
Mastaan (45.8%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (84.0%)
Student/ Youth leader (64.0%)
Mastaan (32.0%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border
Politician (87.5%)
Mastaan (39.6%)
Student/ Youth leader (37.5%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Politician (88.6%)
Student/ Youth leader (61.4%)
Mastaan (46.6%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Politician (89.5%)
Religious group (42.1%)
Mastaan (15.8%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Politician (91.5%)
Student/ Youth leader (59.6%)
Mastaan (44.7%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (96.3%)
Mastaan (63.0%)
Student/ Youth leader (50.0%)
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Note: Options included government official, business person, mastaan, professional 
group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.), politician, police, large landowner, 
non-political community leader, media professional, student/ youth leader, labor 
leader, non-political religious group, others.
The main individuals that journalists identify as having been involved in the electoral 
violence in their constituencies include politicians, mastaans and student or youth 
leaders. Table 2-20 presents the most commonly cited types of individuals involved in 
electoral violence in the lead up to the election in January of 2014; showing the highest 
percentages of journalists who had identified the type for each constituency. Almost 
across the board, politicians are recognized as playing a role in the electoral violence, 
with smaller percentages of journalists also recognizing mastaans and student or youth 
leaders. The one exception is Rajshahi constituency, where 42.1 percent of journalists 
claimed that religious groups were involved in electoral violence.
Table 2-21 Top Three Individuals Involved in Electoral Violence Prior to 
2014 Election AND a Crime for Profit
Case Name by Division Description Types of People Involved
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Politician (75.0%)
Student/ youth leader (54.2%)
Mastaan (41.7%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (82.0%)
Student/ youth leader (54.0%)
Police (34.0%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border
Politician (81.4%)
Mastaan (48.8%)
Student/ youth leader (44.2%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Politician (85.9%)
Student/ youth leader (64.7%)
Mastaan (46.5%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Politician (89.5%)
Police (31.6%)
Mastaan, Student/ youth leader 
(21.1%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Politician (93.6%)
Student/ youth leader (48.9%)
Mastaan (46.8%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Politician (90.7%)
Mastaan (59.3%)
Student/youth leader (51.9%)
Note: Options included government official, business person, mastaan, professional 
group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.), politician, police, large landowner, 
non-political community leader, media professional, student/ youth leader, labor 
leader, non-political religious group, others. 
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Overall, the data suggest some overlap in the types of individuals involved in both electoral 
violence and the common crimes for profit, including land grabbing and drug dealing. 
Table 2-21 summarizes the top three types of individuals identified by journalists to be 
involved both in election violence and any of the most common types of crimes for profit. 
The politicians are the most commonly cited group associated with electoral violence, 
along with student and youth leaders, and mastaans. In a sense, the heavy involvement of 
student and youth leaders may indicate an overlap with mastaan-like activities, suggesting 
that they are not two distinct groups.
Winning Support in 2008
Table 2-22  Most Common Ways Politicians Encouraged Voters in 2008
Case Name by Division Description Ways to Win Votes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Commitment to law and order/ anti-
corruption (50.0%)
Paid cash/ food for votes (50.0%)
Anti-incumbency (alternative to ruling party) 
(41.8%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Commitment to law and order/ anti-
corruption (54.9%)
Commitment to development (47.1%)
Rewarded voters with government benefits 
(31.4%)
3 Chittagong Constituency
Semi Rural/ 
Border
Commitment to law and order/ anti-
corruption (60.0%)
Simply provide an alternative to ruling party 
(60.0%)
Commitment to development (46.0%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Commitment to law and order/ anti-
corruption (55.4%)
Commitment to development (40.2%)
 Rewarded voters with government benefits 
(33.7%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Commitment to development (47.4%)
Commitment to law and order/ anti-
corruption (42.1%)
Paid cash/ food (36.8%)
6 Khulna Constituency
Rural/ 
Coastal
Commitment to law and order/ anti-
corruption (40.0%)
Voter intimidation (34.0%)
Rewarded voters with government benefits 
(34.0%)
30
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
 Commitment to development (48.1%)
Simply provide an alternative to the ruling 
party (42.6%)
Commitment to law and order/ anti-
corruption (35.2%)
Note: Options included commitment to law and order/ anti-corruption, voter intimidation, 
convinced voters of quality of candidate, rewarded voters with government 
benefits, paid cash/ food, voter mobilization, paid party activists with patronage, 
inspired party loyalty, commitment to development, alternative to ruling party, 
used religious sentiment.  
The factors identified by journalists that motivated voters to support politicians in the 2008 
election included commitment of the candidate to development, law and order and anti-
corruption. Table 2-22 summarizes the top selections by journalists regarding the ways that 
politicians encouraged votes. These ‘positive’ factors were more commonly recognized 
than such factors as rewarding voters with government benefits, paying party activists with 
patronage and using religious sentiment. However, the quality of the candidate was not 
recognized as a leading motive for voters.  
Table 2-23 Most Common Ways that Politicians Reward People for their 
Political Support in 2008
Case Name by Division Description Types of Patronage
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
VGD/ VGF Distribution (50.0%)
Gov’t contracts (50.0%)
Access to markets (41.7%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
VGD/ VGF Distribution (37.3%)
Gov’t contracts (29.4%)
Public employment (29.4%)
3 Chittagong Constituency
Semi Rural/ 
Border
Gov’t contracts (72.5%)
VGD/ VGF Distribution (40.0%)
Public employment (37.5%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
VGD/ VGF Distribution (47.3%)
Gov’t contracts (49.5%)
SMC position/ college management 
position (44.0%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
VGD/ VGF Distribution (68.4%)
Other safety net programs (47.3%)
Fertilizer and Seed Distribution (36.8%)
6 Khulna Constituency
Rural/ 
Coastal
VGD/ VGF Distribution (40.0%)
Khas land/ wetlands access (47.8%)
Security from police (39.1%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
VGD/ VGF Distribution (57.4%)
Food for work (46.3%)
Public employment (42.6%)
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Note: Options include: VGD/VGD distribution, government contracts, SMC position/ 
college management position, food for work program, fertilizer and seed 
distribution, khas land/ wetlands access, security from police, access to market 
areas/ lease of market place, other safety net programs, controlling transport 
business, private employment, public employment, other. 
However, the journalists still recognized the role of other forms of patronage in mobilizing 
support for the 2008 election, especially VGD/ VGF distribution. Table 2-23 presents, 
the most widely recognized rewards for political support used by politicians. Again, 
journalists identified VGD/ VGF distribution as the most often used form of reward for 
support by politicians, though it is unclear whether this was done before or after the 
election. A variety of other forms of reward were also highlighted in particular cases, 
including government contracts, other safety net programs, access to khas land or 
wetlands and others.  
Finally, when asked about the most common forms of local corruption in the constituency, 
journalists commonly mentioned LGED, the land office, police and access to market areas. 
The question was open-ended, and as such, they could respond in any way they pleased. 
Journalists also mentioned other forms of corruption including government recruitment, 
tender, health and education departments, disaster management and real estate projects. 
Mastaan Power
Journalists provided a general assessment of the level of power among mastaans in their 
constituency.   
Table 2-24 Level of Mastaan Power in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Average Score (1-5)
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 4.08
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 3.12
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 3.67
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 2.89
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 2.74
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 4.09
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 3.80
Note: 5 = Extremely powerful, 4 = Very powerful, 3 = Moderately powerful, 2 = A bit 
powerful, 1 = Not powerful at all.
Average estimates of the influence of mastaans in the constituencies varied between the 
constituencies. Table 2-24 shows the average rating by journalists for the level of mastaan 
power in the constituency. The data ranges from 2.74 to 4.09, where 2 is a bit powerful, 
3 moderately powerful and 4 is very powerful. In other words, in the Khulna constituency, 
journalists on average estimate that mastaans are very powerful, while in the Rajshahi 
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constituency, they estimate that mastaans are somewhere between a bit powerful and 
moderately powerful. In none of the constituencies are mastaans not powerful at all (rating 
of 1), nor are they extremely powerful (a rating of 5).  
Table 2-25 Level of Mastaan Power in terms of Control of Criminal Activities 
in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Average Score (1-5)
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 4.00
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 2.94
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 3.55
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 2.86
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 2.74
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 3.68
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 3.63
Note: 5 = Extremely powerful, 4 = Very powerful, 3 = Moderately powerful, 2 = A bit 
powerful, 1 = Not powerful at all.
Mastaans generally had substantial influence on the crime in the study areas, though 
with some variation. Table 2-25 indicates the average ratings for journalist for the level 
of mastaan power over criminal activities in the constituency. Rajshahi constituency is 
at the low end with 2.74, while the Khulna constituency is the highest at 3.68 (between 
moderately and very powerful). Interestingly, the Khulna constituency estimate for control 
over crime by mastaans is less than the overall power of mastaans. But overall, the 
estimates suggest that mastaans in all the cases bear a substantial influence over crime 
in their area.
Table 2-26 Level of Mastaan Power in terms of Inciting Electoral Violence 
in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Average Score (1-5)
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 3.67
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 2.84
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 3.44
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 2.93
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 2.95
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 3.72
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 3.33
Note: 5 = Extremely powerful, 4 = Very powerful, 3 = Moderately powerful, 2 = A bit 
powerful, 1 = Not powerful at all.
Mastaans substantially influence electoral violence in their respective constituencies as 
well. Table 2-26 presents the average journalist ratings for mastaan power in terms of 
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inciting electoral violence in the constituency. The data ranges from 2.84 in the Sylhet 
constituency (nearly moderately powerful) to 3.72 in the Khulna constituency (nearly very 
powerful), which represents some level of variation.
Table 2-27 Level of Mastaan Power in terms of Influencing Electoral 
Outcomes in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Average Score (1-5)
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 3.79
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 2.75
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 3.41
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 2.64
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 2.53
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 3.87
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 3.48
Note: 5 = Extremely powerful, 4 = Very powerful, 3 = Moderately powerful, 2 = A bit 
powerful, 1 = Not powerful at all.
Mastaans also have an impact on elections in each of the cases. Table 2-27 summarizes 
the average ratings by journalists for the level of mastaan power in terms of influencing 
electoral outcomes in the constituency. They range from 2.53 in the Rajshahi constituency 
(between a bit to moderately powerful) to 3.87 in Khulna constituency (nearly very 
powerful).  
Table 2-28 Presence of Female Mastaans in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Percentage that Answered Yes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 12.5%
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 2.6%
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 16.7%
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 9.4%
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 0.0%
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 33.3%
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 18.9%
While the vast majority of journalists determined that there were no female mastaans in 
their respective constituency, there was a sizeable minority in the Khulna constituency who 
indicated that possibility. Table 2-28 summarizes the journalist views regarding whether 
there are any female mastaans in the case study area. Except in Rajshahi where every 
journalist answered no, there were a small number of journalists in each constituency that 
responded yes, the most being in the Khulna constituency where one-third of the journalists 
identified at least one female mastaan in the area.  
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Profile of the Most Powerful Mastaan in the Constituency
Each journalist identified the individual who, in their opinion, was the most powerful 
mastaan in their constituency. The following data focuses on this individual, who may or 
may not be the same for each journalist. 
Table 2-29 Top Three Forms of Crime for Profit in which the Most Powerful 
Mastaan Is Involved in the Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Forms of Crime for Profit
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
Drug Dealing (90.5%)
Land Grabbing (85.7%)
Extortion (76.2%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Land Grabbing (74.5%)
Violent in-fighting (59.6%)
Extortion (55.3%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border
Drug Dealing (85.4%)
Drug smuggling (79.2%)
Land grabbing, Extortion (75%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Extortion (72.2%)
Drug Dealing (64.4%)
Land Grabbing (56.7%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Drug Dealing (78.9%)
Extortion (57.9%)
Drug smuggling (57.9%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Land Grabbing (91.5%)
Extortion (78.7%)
Drug Dealing (57.4%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Extortion (81.5%)
Land Grabbing (81.1%)
Drug Dealing (63.0%)
Note: Options included Land Grabbing, Drug Dealing, Drug Smuggling, Extortion, Theft, 
Garment Leftovers, Arms Smuggling, violent in-fighting.
Land grabbing, drug dealing and extortion represent the most commonly identified 
forms of crime for profit that the powerful mastaans are involved in. Table 2-29 provides. 
The responses are not surprising for land grabbing and drug dealing, given that they 
represent the most common and profitable forms of crime in the areas. However, more 
surprising is the identification of extortion as a principal activity of powerful mastaans, 
which journalists did not emphasize as strongly in their assessment of crime. Powerful 
mastaans therefore appear to specialize in extortion, as opposed to other individuals in 
the constituency. 
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Table 2-30 Top Professions of the Most Powerful Mastaans in the 
Constituency
Case Name by Division Description Types of Professions
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 
None (76.2%)
Other Profession (14.3%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
None (59.1%)
Other Profession (34.1%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border None (84.8%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
None (50.0%)
Business person (39.3%)
Other Profession (25.0%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
None (52.6%)
Other Profession (42.1%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
None (46.8%)
Other Profession (44.7%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Other profession (37.0%)
Business person (37.0%)
None (33.3%)
Note: options include lawyer, business person, landowner, media professional, land 
owner/ farmer, none, other.
For the most part, mastaans do not have an official profession. Table 2-30 summarizes 
the most commonly identified professions of mastaans, with ‘other profession’ and ‘none’ 
being the most common answers by far. They are not active as land owners, farmers, 
business people or other common local professions.  
Table 2-31 Whether the Most Powerful Mastaan Has Been Arrested 
Case Name by Division Description Percentage that Answered Yes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 57.9%
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 65.1%
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 79.2%
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 62.8%
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 26.3%
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 60.5%
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 69.8%
The majority of journalists in almost every constituency estimated that the most powerful 
mastaan has been arrested at least once. Table 2-31 summarizes these results, with the 
percentage of journalists who claim that the most powerful mastaan has been arrested 
exceeding 60 percent in all but one constituency, the Rajshahi case. The largest estimate 
is found in Chittagong, at 79.2 percent. 
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Table 2-32 Whether the Most Powerful Mastaan Has Been Prosecuted
Case Name by Division Description Percentage that Answered Yes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 57.9%
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 48.9%
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 54.2%
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 41.2%
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 26.3%
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 44.2%
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 45.2%
The majority of journalists in almost every constituency estimated that the most powerful 
mastaan had not been prosecuted for a crime. Table 2-32 shows the percentage of 
journalists who claim that the most powerful mastaan had been prosecuted, ranging from 
26.3 percent in Rajshahi to 54.2 percent in Chittagong. These percentages are much less 
than the estimates of the arrest of mastaans found in the previous table. The difference 
suggests that, while mastaans are arrested, they are generally not prosecuted afterwards.
Table 2-33 Whether the Most Powerful Mastaan Has Been Convicted
Case Name by Division Description Percentage that Answered Yes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 40.0%
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 27.9%
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 30.6%
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 27.0%
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 15.8%
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 33.3%
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 25.9%
The percentage of journalists who estimate that the most powerful mastaan has been 
convicted of a crime is less than the arrest and prosecution rate, but still greater than 
zero. Table 2-33 presents the percentage of journalists by constituency who confirmed 
that the most powerful mastaan had been convicted. These numbers range from 15.8 
percent to 33.3 percent. As such, the individual that these journalists identify as the most 
powerful mastaan is, at times, someone who has been tried and convicted for a crime. 
In other words, not all mastaans have achieved total immunity from the law. However, 
assuming the journalists are knowledgeable about the mastaan activities, the individuals 
identified by the majority of the journalists in every constituency have not been successfully 
prosecuted.
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Table 2-34 Whether the Mastaan Has Been Elected to a Public Office
Case Name by Division Description Percentage that Answered Yes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 25.0%
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 13.6%
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 6.1%
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 32.6%
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 47.4%
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 68.9%
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 57.7%
The journalists in the constituencies differed widely as to whether the most powerful 
mastaan had been elected to political office. Table 2-34 presents the percentages of 
journalists who affirmed that the most powerful mastaan had been elected by voters. The 
percentages range from 6.1 percent in the Chittagong constituency to 68.9 percent in 
Khulna. In only two of the seven constituencies the majority of journalists claimed that the 
most powerful mastaan had been elected to public office. As such, in some constituencies, 
the individuals identified as the most powerful mastaan become politicians, while in 
others, these individuals appear to avoid public office.
Table 2-35 Whether the Mastaan Has Held an Official Position in a Political 
Party
Case Name by Division Description Percentage that Answered Yes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 70.0%
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 68.2%
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 56.3%
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 80.7%
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 47.4%
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 88.9%
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 76.9%
The majority of journalists in almost every case claimed that the most powerful mastaans 
hold an official position in a political party. Table 2-35 presents the percentage of 
journalists in each constituency who answered that the most powerful mastaan had 
achieved an official position in a political party, though it is not clear which position or 
party that may be. These estimates range from 47.4 percent in Rajshahi to 88.9 percent 
in Khulna. The results suggest that the most powerful mastaans generally play an official 
role in politics in their constituencies.
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Table 2-36   Whether the Mastaan Has a Strong Link with a Politician
Case Name by Division Description Percentage that Answered Yes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 90.0%
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 81.8%
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 83.8%
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 84.9%
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 73.7%
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 91.3%
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 83.0%
The vast majority of journalists in almost every case claimed that the most powerful 
mastaans maintain a close relationship with an elected official. Table 2-36 presents the 
percentage of journalists in each constituency who answered that the most powerful 
mastaan maintained a strong link with a politician. These estimates range from 73.7 
percent in the constituency of Rajshahi division to 91.3 percent in the constituency of 
Khulna division. The results suggest that the most powerful mastaans generally play an 
official role in politics in their constituencies.  
Table 2-37  Mastaan Use of a Variety of Weapons
Case Name by Division Description Weapons Used by Mastaans
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban Handguns (85.7%)
Machetes, explosive cocktails (61.9%)
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural
Machetes (83.7%)
Knives (62.8%)
Sticks (53.5%)
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border
Handguns (91.1%)
Machetes (62.2%)
Knives (62.2%)
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural
Machetes (84.9%)
Knives (81.4%)
Sticks (72.1%)
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural
Knives (79.0%)
Machetes (79.0%)
Sticks (73.4%)
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal
Sticks (71.7%)
Knives (67.4%)
Machetes (67.4%)
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural
Sticks (80.8%)
Machetes (73.1%)
Knives (69.2%)
Note: Options include sticks, knives, machetes, hand guns, rifles, explosive cocktails, 
         grenades, automatic rifles.
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The journalists suggest that the most powerful mastaans primarily use knives, sticks and 
machetes in acts of violence, and occasionally other weapons such as handguns and 
explosive cocktails. Table 2-37 presents these estimates, with the percentage of journalists 
identifying that the most powerful mastaan uses each weapon. Knives, sticks and 
machetes are the most common in almost every case. However, more lethal weapons 
such as handguns and explosive cocktails were commonly identified within the cases, 
such as in Chittagong (91.1 percent for handguns), in Khulna (50 percent for handguns), 
Barisal (55.8 percent for handguns) and Rajshahi (47.4 percent for explosive cocktails). 
Weapons such as grenades, rifles and automatic rifles were only rarely identified in the 
cases.
Table 2-38 Range of Estimates of the Number of Murders Committed by 
the Mastaan
Case Name by Division Description Range
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 2 to 7
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 0 to 9
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 0 to 5
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 0 to 10
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 0 to 2
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 0 to 25
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 0 to 6
Journalists varied in their estimates of the number of murders committed by the most 
powerful mastaans. Table 2-38 presents these estimates for each constituency, which 
range from 0 to 25. The largest estimate for the incidence of murder appears in Khulna, 
at 25, though in each case there is an estimate of 0.
Table 2-39 Range of Estimates of the Number of Grievous Injuries 
Committed by the Mastaan
Case Name by Division Description Range
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 1 to 100
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 0 to 100
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 0 to 5
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 0 to 10
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 0 to 5
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 0 to 100
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 0 to 15
Estimates for the number of grievous injuries are larger than for murders. Table 2-38 
shows the ranges of estimates for each constituency, which vary from 0 in each case, 
and reach 100 in two cases (Sylhet and Khulna constituencies). The presence of grievous 
injuries is indicative of the active use of violence by mastaans.
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Table 2-40 Mastaan Leads Groups Responsible for Electoral Violence
Case Name by Division Description Percentage That Answer Yes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 72.2%
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 78.0%
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 70.5%
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 90.6%
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 73.7%
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 95.2%
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 94.2%
Mastaans appear to lead groups responsible for electoral violence. Table 2-40 presents 
the percentage of journalists who estimate that mastaans lead groups in their constituency 
for violent election protests. These estimates range from 70.5 percent in Chittagong to 
95.2 percent in Khulna. Three of the estimates exceed 90 percent (Rangpur, Khulna and 
Barisal). As such, the vast majority of journalists observe that mastaans provide strong 
leadership as regards electoral violence in their constituencies.  
Table 2-41  Mastaans in General More Powerful than 10 Years Ago
Case Name by Division Description Percentage That Answer Yes
1 Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban 80.0%
2 Sylhet Constituency Semi Rural 82.9%
3 Chittagong Constituency Semi Rural/ Border 59.1%
4 Rangpur Constituency Rural 83.3%
5 Rajshahi Constituency Rural 63.2%
6 Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal 90.5%
7 Barisal Constituency Semi Rural 84.9%
The vast majority of journalists observe that mastaans are growing in power. Table 2-41 
presents the percentage of journalists in each constituency who affirm that mastaans are 
more power than 10 years before. These estimates range from 59.1 percent in Chittagong 
constituency to 90.5 percent in Khulna. It appears that the phenomenon of mastaans in 
Bangladesh is not fading, but instead, their influence has grown over time.  
Conclusion
The observations emerging from the survey identify a number of cross-cutting trends, with 
some regional variation. First, the most common and profitable forms of crime for profit 
are land grabbing and drug dealing. Politicians and mastaans are heavily involved in 
land grabbing, while politicians, the police and mastaans dominate drug dealing in the 
constituencies.  
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Land that is grabbed is most commonly khas land, i.e. government owned land. When 
such land is taken, it is generally used for shops, though there was some regional variation; 
land grabbed in the Khulna division constituency focused on shrimp farms, and the land 
grabbed in the Dhaka division constituency – which bordered the Dhaka metropolitan 
area – tended to use grabbed land primarily for housing the growing urban population, 
as well as shops.  
As relates to electoral activities, the main areas of illegal activities here include political 
violence and patronage. The most common forms of patronage include the distribution 
of benefits from the Vulnerable Group Development Program (VGD) and the Vulnerable 
Group Feeding Program (VGF), though the distribution of government contracts is also 
common, while others vary based on the context. Although respondents generally state 
that politicians, the administration and student and youth leaders are involved in these 
efforts, the survey suggests that mastaans generally are not. (However, as described in 
other research in this project, student and youth leaders are often involved in mastaan-
like activities, so the difference is often obscured). Meanwhile, demonstrations generally 
occurred somewhere between once a month and twice a week in all constituencies during 
the lead up to the recent elections; the demonstrations often become fierce, though with 
few grievous injuries or deaths resulting from electoral violence. Politicians and mastaans, 
along with student and youth leaders, were most commonly involved in electoral violence. 
However, in the analysis of the main factors whereby politicians won support in the 2008 
election, the factors that emerged strongest included commitment to rule of law and anti-
corruption, and commitment to development.  
The specific characteristics of mastaans include the following across the cases. Some 
mastaans are elected to public office, but more frequently they hold official positions 
in political parties, and they almost always hold a strong link to a politician. Mastaans 
have often been arrested at least once, but are rarely prosecuted and even more rarely 
convicted. Finally, mastaan power is increasing over time as well.
The survey suggests that further research is needed along a number of fronts. First, this 
survey is not nationally representative, but rather a small sample of the entire national. 
As such, its conclusions are not generalizable to the whole of Bangladesh. Such national 
research should be completed. Furthermore, this research should test theories as to why 
mastaan-ism is stronger in some locations than others, as well as explain why electoral 
violence and patronage was more extensive in certain areas of the country. Particular 
topics deserve greater scrutiny as well. The precise qualitative features of the relationship 
between politicians and mastaans is a topic that deserves much greater scrutiny, though 
this is partly the focus of the qualitative section of the research project; similarly, an 
in-depth examination of land grabbing is similarly developed, but deserves extensive 
study. The role of student and youth leaders emerged strongly in such aspects as electoral 
violence and patronage activities, a subject that is neglected in the literature. Finally, the 
dynamics of local drug dealing has not been examined and should be the topic of further 
research as well.
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3. Amassing Wealth: An Analysis of 
Bangladeshi MP Asset Declaration 
Forms of 2008 and 2013
Introduction
The survey presented in chapter 2 clearly suggests a strong linkage between politicians 
and mastaans in Bangladesh. While this linkage is often reflected in political violence, 
it also appears in illicit financial activities such as land grabbing. In order to explore the 
financial benefits of public office, this chapter presents an analysis of the various assets 
of MPs.
The declaration forms, submitted by all MPs, provide a view into the wealth of 
parliamentarians, and changes in wealth while in office. The forms present a variety of 
variables, including income from different sources, financial assets, land, and gold. The 
forms also offer data on the educational level of MPs, and criminal cases against them. 
The data is available for 2008 and 2013. Inflation during the period, as measured by 
increases in the CPI, was approximately 44.4 percent.  
In this chapter, we analyze this data, analyzing the overall changes for a variety of 
variables for the 300 territorial MPs, excluding the 50 appointed female parliamentarians. 
We do not pick out individual MP assets, or name individuals, instead making general 
observations regarding the wealth and other characteristics of parliamentarians. 
The logic behind a deeper look at MP assets in a book on mastaans is the following. First, 
there is a substantial involvement of politicians in crimes for profit, according to chapter 
2. This would suggest that politicians benefit greatly from local criminal activities. MPs 
are typically known as the most prominent and powerful of politicians at the local level 
in Bangladesh, implying that they would be the most likely recipients of criminal profits 
among politicians. Unfortunately, income by source is not available for all those involved 
in such crime for profit; however, income data is available for MPs, at a certain level of 
detail. Moreover, as public officials sworn to uphold the law and serve the nation, MPs 
deserve a deeper level of accountability than others.  
While a look at MP asset data does not allow our team to clearly identify the illegal 
sources, it does provide a simple test for the possibility of illegal sources. If the data shows 
that there is little increase in MP assets and income while in power, then it is unlikely they 
use their political positions for criminal activities, assuming the data is reliable. However, 
if there is a substantial increase in MP income and assets during the period in power, 
then we cannot rule out the possibility of illegal sources related to crimes for profit. The 
precise sources of these increases in income and assets, especially where they increase 
dramatically, deserve further scrutiny to see whether MPs, who are sworn to uphold the 
law and serve the nation, are indeed involved in crimes for profit.
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We identify several main trends from the forms submitted in 2008 and 2013, whether in 
the form of income, gold, land or financial assets. However, it is important to note that 
the MP asset data is highly flawed, meaning these observations are tentative, though 
they likely underestimate the actual assets of MPs. Overall, across the board, there are 
dramatic increases in the income and assets of MPs from 2008 to 2013, whether financial 
assets, land, gold or income. The distribution of income and assets per MP, as well as 
growth in assets, is highly skewed to the wealthiest MPs.  
Also, the analysis divided MPs into two groups, MPs re-elected in 2014 and MPs newly 
elected in 2014. In doing so, the analysis would compare the change in the assets for 
the same Member of Parliament in 2013 and 2008 (the re-elected group); it would also 
compare a newly elected MP with the individual who previously held the same post 
(the other group). This data shows that the groups generally experienced comparable 
increases in wealth over time, with some variation. The number of MPs with criminal 
charges, and the total number of criminal charges for parliamentarians, has declined 
between 2008 and 2013.
The Asset Data for Members of Parliament
In 2008, the Bangladesh Election Commission introduced the submission and public 
disclosure of personal declaration forms of parliamentary candidates in an effort to ensure 
better accountability and transparency to the public when choosing their constituency 
representative. The system meant that MP candidates would have to declare a various 
pieces of personal information when they applied for their candidacy.  
The MP Asset Declaration system consists of four forms:
1.  An affidavit regarding the candidate’s assets
2.  Form 20 that summarizes the candidate’s expected income and financing for the 
election
3.  Form 21 that summarizes the candidate’s wealth, debts, annual income and 
expenditures
4.  An Income Statement that lists and describes the candidate’s income sources. 
Using these forms, our team constructed a database of MP assets from 2008 and 
2013. We only compiled such information for territorial MPs (elected directly from their 
constituencies, and not the 50 appointed female parliamentarians, due to time and cost 
limitations  With the data, we were then able to look at a variety of different assets held 
by the MPs, including:
• Various forms of income, aggregated into annual income
• Estimated annual income
• Land assets
• Gold assets
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• Financial assets
• Education achievement
• Current criminal cases and previous convictions
Moreover, we could examine the changes over time for these variables. In other words, 
we compared these variables for the current 10th Parliament of Bangladesh (2014-present) 
with those of the previous parliament, the 9th Parliament of Bangladesh (2009-2013). This 
similarly showed the changes for MPs who were re-elected in the elections of January 
2014, where we could see how much their assets may have increased or decreased since 
the previous election, whether due to both legitimate and illegitimate activities during their 
time as an MP. 
The years of submission for the forms are 2008 and 2013, as the personal declaration 
forms are joined with the nomination papers submitted by the candidates. There is no 
separate timeline for submitting these declaration forms.  The nomination paper submission 
deadline varies, but it starts from the declaration of election schedule - usually 45 days. 
However, sometimes it may come down to 10 days, as the case of 10th parliament 
election. During this span of time, candidates can submit the forms at any time.
Flaws in the Data and Limitations of the Analysis
Unfortunately, the declaration form system of MP candidates is often highly flawed, 
indicating major discrepancies in the asset declaration system. There is no verification 
system established to ensure the declaration forms are completed to the best of the MPs’ 
knowledge. These flaws introduce a number of potential biases to the data and result in 
incomplete and inaccurate data. As a result, the data here must be used and interpreted 
with caution. The main bias is under-reporting in assets, in which MPs declare fewer assets 
than they actually own. However, in the case of education, they may exaggerate their 
achievements, or may fail to declare their full criminal record.  
There are several ways in which this data is flawed. Quite often, the forms are not filled 
out completely, or with impossible answers provided, such as a zero indicated for the 
income of a candidate who is an MP (and therefore earns a salary). We expect MPs with 
the most assets, i.e. the richest MPs, to under-report this information, especially if those 
assets were gained in an illicit manner. This bias naturally leads us to suspect that the 
assets and income derived from criminal activity may not appear in these forms.
A further problem is the mixed use of units; for example, land may be presented in value 
(whether historical or present is unclear) or any of three quantity units. The mixing of units 
presents a comparison between MPs. Finally, the forms often have redundant categories, 
e.g. for sources of income the Affidavit asks the candidates to enter information for both 
categories of ‘Job’ and ‘Profession’. This may be confusing for candidates and the same 
information may be entered more than once.
Also, the accuracy, or so-called statistical significance, of our analysis is limited because 
we had to drop much of the data. In some cases, we erased half of the data, leaving the 
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assets of only 150 of the 300 MPs being analyzed. We would drop them because of 
impossible answers (such as zero income) and also inconsistent measures, such as a few 
MPs who declared their land value and not the total amount of land.
None of these limitations to the data is necessary, though. A strong system of asset 
declaration would ensure its accuracy, especially with a clear system of verification. Other 
steps may be taken to address the weaknesses in the declaration system. For reference, we 
provide a more detailed critique of the declaration forms and a set of recommendations 
for the Election Commission to improve its asset declaration system, in Appendix 1.
Annual Income
The Affidavit asks candidates to enter their annual income from seven listed categories, 
which include: Agriculture, Rent, Business, Financial Assets, Profession, Job, and Others. 
The candidates must provide information on the annual income they receive from each 
source along with income of any dependents from these sources. As a result, the items 
here measure more than simply the income of the MPs themselves.
Agriculture: Candidates provide the total annual income they and their dependents 
derive from agriculture. There is no mention of whether the candidate’s income from the 
sector comes from direct employment or from agriculture related business. 
Rent: Candidates provide the annual income they and their dependents receive on 
renting a house, store, apartments or any other asset. There is no specification of the 
exact source of rent as only the total annual rental income is provided.
Business: Candidates provide the total annual income they and their dependents receive 
from undertaking business. However, there is no specification of the kind or number of 
businesses they or their dependents are involved in. 
Financial Assets: Candidates provide the total annual income they and their dependents 
receive from different types of financial assets, which include securities, bank savings, 
bank bonds, etc. Similar to other categories, there is no breakdown of the kinds and 
amount of income received from different financial assets held by the candidate and the 
dependents.
Profession & Job: Candidates provide information on their and their dependents’ annual 
income from professional work. The form provides examples of profession as teaching, 
law, advising etc. However, the very next category, ‘Job’ asks candidates to provide the 
annual income they and their dependents receive from their jobs. The two categories 
overlap and make the information ambiguous.  A breakdown of all allowances provided 
to MPs is provided in Appendix 2, as the income should be included in this category.
Others: The form includes an ‘Others’ category to accommodate for any missing income 
category. Though the form asks for a specification of the income source, the majority of 
candidates are found to include large amounts of income information without mentioning 
the source in this section. 
46
In preparing this data, we were forced to drop numerous observations as the MPs claimed 
that they and their dependents had zero income, or they failed to fill in the form. In the 
2008 data, we dropped 9 observations, as each of them reported zero income; in the 
2013 data, we dropped 17 observations for the same reason.  
Aggregate Annual Income
To determine the total annual income for territorial MPs and their dependents in 2008 
and 2013, we aggregated each of the above items, dropping observations as described 
above. This allowed a comparison over time of all elements of their incomes.
Figure 3-1 Average Total MP Income
The average annual income of MPs, along with that of immediate dependents, grew 
substantially over the period. As shown in Figure 3-1, the average annual income of MPs in 
2008 was BDT 2,327,000, which increased to BDT 9,871,000 in 2013. This difference 
represents a growth of 324 percent in a period of fewer than six years. As mentioned, 
inflation during the period, as measured by increases in the CPI, was approximately 44.4 
percent.
Figure 3-2 Average MP Annual Income by Quintile in 2008 and 2013, in BDT
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A breakdown of average annual income for MPs by quintile suggests three trends: 
substantial income inequality, an increasing level of inequality, and a much larger growth 
in income among the top quintile than the others. Figure 3-2 highlights these three separate 
trends. First, for inequality, in 2013, the top income quintile of MPs had an average 
income of BDT 41.0 million, while the bottom quintile earned just BDT 325,000. In other 
words, the top-most quintile of MPs earned an average income that was 126 times the 
average income of the bottom quintile.  
A second trend is that inequality of aggregated income between the top and bottom 
quintiles of MPs increases over the time period. The first income quintile of MPs in 2008 
was just BDT 8.8 million, while the average for the bottom quintile was 212,000, which 
translates into a ratio of 41 times. In other words, the top-most quintile of MPs earned an 
average aggregate income that was 41 times that of the bottom quintile in 2008, which 
increased to 126 times in 2013.  
Also, from 2008 to 2013, the greatest increases in earnings are in the top quintile, as 
illustrated in Figure 32. The average MP income for the first quintile jumped from BDT 8.8 
million to BDT 41.0 million, or 365 percent. In the fifth quintile, the average MP income 
rose from BDT 212,000 to BDT 325,000, or 53 percent. As such, the increase among the 
top quintile was more than seven times greater than the increase for the bottom quintile. 
This comparison does not, however, mean that the individuals in the top quintile of 2013 
were the same as those individuals in the top quintile of 2008; instead, they may have 
been newly elected, or increased their income from a lower level.  
Figure 3-3 Average MP Annual Income from Various Sources in 2008, in BDT
In 2008, the largest source of income for MPs and their dependents was business, 
followed by rent and financial assets. Figure 3-3 shows that, in 2008, with an average 
earning of BDT 747,000, business provided by far the greatest earnings for MPs and their 
dependents. At BDT 537,000, the second largest source was financial assets, while the 
third was ‘others’ at BDT 351,000. The smallest source of income for MPs in 2008 was 
agriculture, with an average of BDT 51,000.
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Figure 3-4 MP Income from Various Sources in 2013, in BDT
2013 saw a similar order in terms of sources of MP income, as seen in Figure 3-4. At 
the top, business represents BDT 4,415,000 of the average MP income. Financial assets 
were still the second largest source of income, at BDT 2,052,000. Meanwhile, the other 
category, at BDT 1,452,000, became the third largest source of annual income. The 
lowest source, profession, represented an average of BDT 240,000.
Figure 3-5 Increase in MP Income from Various Sources, 2008 to 2013 in %
The change in average aggregate annual incomes of territorial MPs and their dependents 
from 2008 to 2013 was extremely high across almost all categories, but especially in 
business. These percentage changes appear in Figure 3-5. Business income, the largest 
source of income for MPs, increased by 491 percent during the period. The second 
largest, financial assets, increased by 282 percent, while the ‘others’ category jumped 
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by 314 percent. As a result, not only is the average business income of MPs the largest 
source of income in both years, but it also saw the second largest increase over the 
time period. Agriculture, though, was extremely small in both years, but saw the largest 
increase from 2008 to 2013, at 698 percent.
Figure 3-6  MP Business Income in 2008 and 2013, in BDT
As with the overall aggregate annual income, the top quintile drove most of the growth in 
incomes from business. Exhibited in Figure 3-6, the average MP business income for the 
top quintile in 2008 was just BDT 3.4 million, increasing to BDT 21.1 million, a growth 
of 530 percent between the top quintiles of those years. For the fifth quintile, the 2008 
average business income was just BDT 43,000 and zero in 2013.
Average Aggregate Annual Income Increases for Re-elected 
and Other MPs
In order to better analyze the changes in income while MPs were in office, we divided 
MPs into two groups. In the re-elected group, the same individual MP in Parliament from 
2008-2013 was also elected in the January 2014 election. In the ‘other’ category, the 
individual MP in 2008 did not win the same seat in 2014. Overall, 150 territorial MPs 
were re-elected in 2014, with another 150 new individuals entering MP posts. After 
dropping zero incomes, these numbers declined to 144 MPs in the re-elected group and 
140 for others in the 2013 data, as well as 144 for the re-elected and 147 for the other 
groups in the 2008 data.
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Figure 3-7 MP Income in 2008 and 2013, Based on the 2014 Election, in BDT
The average aggregate incomes of MPs in both groups, the re-elected and other group, 
differed slightly. As seen in Figure 3-7, the average aggregate MP income in 2008 was 
almost the same for the re-elected group and the other group, at BDT 2.3 million. The 
total average MP income in 2013 differed between the groups, at BDT 10.6 million for 
the re-elected group and BDT 9.2 million for the other group. This income in 2013 for the 
re-elected group should include the minimum annual personal allowance earned as MPs, 
which is BDT 330,000 (for all elements of the allowance, see Appendix 2).
Figure 3-8 Increase in Aggregate MP Income, Based on the 2014 Election, 
in %
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The increases in aggregate income for the re-elected group and the other group were 
similar. Figure 3-8 shows a comparison of the percentage rise in average aggregate 
income from 2008 to 2013 for these groups as well as for all territorial MPs. The increase 
in total annual income for the total was 324 percent. For the ‘other’ group, the percentage 
increase was lower at 292 percent, while for re-elected MPs, the increase was 355 
percent.  
Figure 3-9 Various Sources of MP Income in 2008, Based on the 2014 
Election, in BDT 
In 2008, the principal income sources for the two groups differed, with the re-elected 
group strongly dominating the area of business. Figure 3-9 shows the average annual 
income of MPs from various sources in 2008, divided into the two categories of re-elected 
and other. For MPs who were re-elected in 2014, the most important source of income in 
2008 was business, followed by financial assets and then rent; on average, MPs earned 
BDT 920,000 for business, and BDT 327,000 and BDT 303,000 for financial assets and 
rent respectively. However, for those who were not re-elected to parliament in 2014, when 
they submitted their forms in 2008, they derived the largest income from financial assets, 
followed by business and other sources. These averages for the not re-elected group 
peaked at BDT 742,000 for financial assets, as well as BDT 579,000 and BDT 456,000 
respectively for business and other sources.
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Figure 3-10 Average MP Income in 2013 from Various Sources, Based on 
the 2014 Election, in BDT
By 2013, the average income of re-elected MPs was quite similar to that of all other MPs, 
particularly in the area of business. Figure 3-10 exhibits the average annual income of 
MPs and their dependents in 2013 from a variety of sources, as divided into the same two 
groups found in Figure 3-9. For both re-elected MPs and all other MPs, their top sources 
of income were business and financial assets. On average, their business incomes were 
BDT 4.5 million and BDT 4.3 million for the re-elected and other groups respectively. 
Financial assets averaged BDT 1.9 million and BDT 2.2 million respectively as well. The 
groups differed slightly on the third largest income source, ‘others’, in which the re-elected 
group collected an average of BDT 1.9 million and the other group an average of BDT 
1.0 million.
In sum, there was a rapid increase in the aggregate income of territorial MPs from 2008 
to 2013 at 324 percent.  While there was an increase among all income quintiles, the 
largest increases – both in absolute and percentage increases - were found in the top 
quintile. Most of this growth was in the area of business income, which surged 530 
percent for the top quintiles from 2008 to 2013. When broken down by the re-elected 
and other MP groups from 2014, the re-elected MP group started at a similar level of 
income in 2008 than ‘others’. By 2013, the re-elected group earned slightly more than 
other MPs.
Estimated Annual Income
Declaration forms submitted by MPs provide information on the estimated annual income 
of MPs. There are two primary differences between this item and the aggregate annual 
income sum found above. First, this income data is requested as a sum total, meaning that 
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the MPs must calculate their own income. Second, this income data does not include the 
income from dependents. Overall, the 2008 estimated annual income is comparable to the 
aggregate annual income found above (averaging BDT 1.8 million and 2.3 respectively), 
but the 2013 figure is lower for the estimated annual income (BDT 7.3 million and BDT 
9.9 million respectively). This difference may be at least partly driven by the exclusion of 
dependents from the estimated annual income. Moreover, 23 MPs in 2008 and 23 MPs 
in 2013 declared zero annual income, which we dropped in our analysis.  
Figure 3-11, Average Estimated Annual Income of MPs, in BDT
The average annual income of territorial MPs increased substantially from 2008 to 2013. 
Figure 3-11 shows that this average estimated annual income started at BDT 1.8 million 
in 2008, growing to BDT 7.3 million in 2013. The increase in this period for territorial 
MPs was 296 percent.  
Figure 3-12, Average Estimated Annual Income of MPs by Quintile, in 2008 
and 2013, in BDT
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As with the aggregate annual income, the estimated annual income data shows there is 
substantial income inequality among MPs. Figure 3-12 shows the breakdown by quintile 
in 2008 and 2013. While the top quintile earned an average of BDT 7.0 million in 
2008, the second income quintile earned much less at BDT 1.2 million and the bottom 
quintile just 159,000. The top quintile in 2013 earned an average of BDT 29.7 million, 
an increase from 2008 of 323 percent. Meanwhile, the increase in the 5th quintile was 
still a substantial 97 percent from 2008 to 2013.
Figure 3-13, Average Estimated Annual Income of MPs, Based on the 2014 
Election, in BDT
The increase in the estimated annual income for the re-elected and other groups was both 
large and similar. Figure 3-13 shows the increase of average financial assets for MPs from 
2008 to 2013. The data suggests that, the average MP in 2008 earned BDT 1.8 million, 
increasing to BDT 7.3 million in 2013, representing a growth of 296 percent. Figure 3-13 
further divides MPs into two groups: re-elected MPs and ‘others’. Re-elected group had 
an average of BDT 2.2 million in 2008, which rose by 227 percent to BDT 7.3 million 
in 2013. Meanwhile, for the ‘Other’ group, which compares the other MPs of 2014 with 
their predecessors, the average income in 2013 was BDT 7.3 million, up 403 percent 
from BDT 1.4 million in 2008.
Land Holdings
The affidavit forms gathered information on the ownership of land by MPs. The forms 
divided these holdings into two types: agricultural and non-agricultural. As with the 
income declaration, there is a downward bias to declaration of assets, as MPs may not 
want to declare their full land holdings.  
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42 MPs claimed they possessed no land, whether agricultural or non-agricultural, in 
2013, and 39 did the same in 2008. While zero income was rather unbelievable, one 
cannot preclude the possibility of MPs not owning land. As such, these numbers remained 
in the sample, which likely represents a strong downward bias due to a failure to report. 
The data faced a further limitation, as it did not specify the unit by which the land should be 
measured. As such, quantity measures often appeared, whether katha, decimal or acre. 
Our team recalculated these into a single unit: acre. However, numerous MPs declared the 
value of their land assets as well. It is unclear whether this value represented the officially 
declared value, which is often an inaccurate representation of the market value, given the 
government regulations on land prices and the commonly observed misreporting of land 
value. Also, the land value may represent the price paid for the land at purchase, whether 
four or forty years ago. As such, our team simply dropped all observations in which land 
was measured by value. There were 62 such observations dropped in 2008 and 69 
observations dropped in 2013.  
Figure 3-14  MP Land Holdings in 2008 and 2013, in Acres
From 2008 to 2013, the landholdings of MPs increased for both types of land: agricultural 
and non-agricultural. The average total land holdings of MPs, shown in Figure 3-14, 
measured as follows. Average total land holdings in 2008 were 7.5 acres, which rose 
to 9.0 acres in 2013, representing an increase of 20 percent. The majority of the land is 
termed as agricultural, with an average holding of 5.1 acres in 2008 and 6.3 in 2013. 
The average holding of non-agricultural land was just 2.4 acres in 2008, but this rose to 
2.7 acres in 2013, accounting for approximately one-fifth of the absolute increase in total 
land holdings of MPs.
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Figure 3-15  MP Land Holdings in 2008 and 2013, by Quintile, in Acres
Overall, the vast majority of the increase in land holdings from 2008 to 2013 was found 
only in the top quintile. Figure 3-15 breaks down the landholdings for these years by 
quintile. The top-most quintile increased their total land by 29 percent from 2008 to 2013, 
while each of the other quintiles actually saw a drop in their land ranging from 2 percent 
decline for the second quintile to 62 percent decline for the bottom quintile (most of whom 
declared zero land holdings for both years).  
Figure 3-16  MP Land Holdings in 2008 Based on the 2014 Election, in 
Acres
In 2008, the type and amount of land owned by the re-elected and the ‘other’ groups 
differed. Figure 3-16 shows the land owned by these two groups for just 2008. As 
explained previously, in the re-elected category on the left, the same individual MP in 
2008 was also elected in the January 2014 election. In the not-re-elected category, the 
individual MPs in 2008 did not win the same seats in 2013. Overall, the MPs who were 
re-elected owned less land, at an average of 6.2 acres each, than the MPs who were not 
re-elected, at 8.8 acres each. The difference was found in non-agricultural land, where 
re-elected MPs owned 3.7 acres on average, versus 1.0 acre for the other group.
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Figure 3-17  MP Land Holdings in 2013 Based on 2014 Election, in Acres
In 2013, the landholdings of MPs in the two groups were again mixed. Figure 3-17 shows 
the breakdown of land assets in 2013, divided according to the election results of 2014. 
For those who were re-elected, the average total land owned in 2013, at 9.1 acres, was 
slightly than that of MPs in the ‘other’ group (who were newly elected), having 8.8 acres. 
Moreover, the ‘other’ group of MPs had a much larger ratio of non-agricultural land to 
total land, 40 percent versus 20 percent for re-elected MPs. 
Figure 3-18  Change in MP Land Holdings Based on 2014 Election, in %
The growth in non-agricultural land from 2008 to 2013 was large relative to agricultural 
land for MPs in the re-elected group, but not the ‘other’ group. Figure 3-18 shows the 
percentage increase in land holdings for MPs when comparing 2008 and 2013, and 
divided between the re-elected and ‘other’ categories. In this ‘other’ category, newly 
elected MPs had the same amount of land than their predecessors, did not change. The 
total land owned by be-elected MPs increased by 47 percent. Non-agricultural land 
accounted for much of the growth for both groups, where re-elected MPs increased their 
non-agricultural land by 71 percent. Agricultural land also grew for both groups the 
re-elected group, at 42 percent.
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Gold
The affidavit forms collected basic information on the amount of gold owned by MPs and 
their dependents. This data is flawed in several aspects. First, there were a number of zero 
entries. In 2008, there were 23 observations that were zero, and 27 in 2013. As this is 
plausible, as with the land, our team did not drop any of these observations. However, 
they may be indicative of a downward bias in the information submitted.  
Second, there were a variety of units used by the MPs when submitting their forms. A 
number of MPs used the unit of grams, while others used Tula. We converted these to 
the bhori unit, which represents 11.664 grams. For those submissions with a taka unit, 
we dropped the observations – a total of 98 for each year, leaving 202 observations for 
analysis in 2008 and 2013.  
Figure 3-19 Gold Owned by MPs, in Bhori
Note: 1 gold bhori = 11.664 grams
There was a substantial increase in the amount of gold owned by MPs from 2008 to 
2013. In 2008, a parliamentarian on average owned 36.5 bhori of gold, which grew to 
44 bhori of gold in 2013. This difference represents a 21.7 percent increase in average 
gold holdings among MPs.
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Figure 3-20 Gold holdings of MPs, Based on the 2014 Election, in Bhori
Note: 1 gold bhori = 11.664 grams
The amount of gold owned by the re-elected group grew substantially from 2008 to 2013, 
unlike the ‘other’ group. Figure 3-20 divides the average gold holdings of MPs into the 
‘other’ and re-elected groups. The two groups were roughly equivalent in 2008, reporting 
36.7 bhoris of gold for the ‘other’ group and 36.3 for the re-elected group. However, 
that changed in 2013, when the ‘other’ group reported less gold than before, with 32.3 
bhoris of gold, while the re-elected group reported 56.9 bhoris of gold. Accordingly, the 
amount of gold owned by the re-elected group was increased by 56.9 percent. 
Just two constituencies drove much of this increase in gold holdings of re-elected MPs. 
The amount of gold owned by one MP increased from 65 to 1,144 Bhori, and the other 
from 10 to 870 bhori. Without these two enormous increases, whose magnitude leaves 
us to doubt that the person completing the forms did so accurately, the data present a 
somewhat different picture, as seen in Figure 3-21.
Figure 3-21 Average Gold Holdings of MPs without Top Two, in Bhori, 
Based on the 2014 Election
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After deleting these top two increases in gold holdings, the growth in gold holdings for 
the re-elected group declines from 56.9 percent to 9.7 percent. The results are presented 
in Figure 3-21. The average holdings for this group start at 36.3 bhori per MP in 2008, 
rising to 39.8 bhori per MP. The fact that two MPs drive much of the growth in gold assets 
among parliamentarians again suggests a very high level of inequality among MPs.
Financial Assets
Form 21 required candidates to state their financial assets. This term includes securities, 
bonds, savings bonds, bank account balances and others. In 2008, of the 300 territorial 
MPs, 153 declared zero or failed to fill out the item. Meanwhile, in 2013, 134 declared 
zero or failed to fill it out. As with land, it is possible that the territorial MPs do not own 
any form of financial asset, and as such, we did not delete any of the data that claimed 
zero assets. However, once again, there is a strong possibility that the MPs simply did 
not bother filling in the form; and without a strong verification system, it is not possible to 
know if this is true.  
The inclusion of the zero financial asset data likely introduces a downward bias to the 
data. As a result, the analysis presented here possibly under-estimates the true amount of 
financial assets of MPs. Again, without a verification system, the level at which this data 
is under estimated is not possible to determine.  
Figure 3-22  Average Financial Assets of MPs, in BDT
Financial assets, more than any other financial data presented, increased dramatically 
from 2008 to 2013. Figure 3-22 shows an increase of an average level of financial assets 
per MP from BDT 8.6 million to BDT 255 million. This difference represents a rise of 2,875 
percent over the period; in other words, the average financial assets of territorial MPs and 
their dependents in 2013 was nearly 30 times that in 2008.  
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Figure 3-23  Average Financial Assets of MPs, by 2014 Election Result, in BDT
By far, the largest increase in financial assets was the other group, as opposed to the re-
elected group. As seen in Figure 3-23, for the re-elected MPs, the average financial assets 
rose from BDT 8.6 million to BDT 39.4 million, a growth of 357 percent. Meanwhile, the 
increase in average financial assets for other MPs to their predecessors was from BDT 8.5 
million to BDT 445 million. This change represents a growth of 5,136 percent.  
This inordinately large growth in financial assets is primarily attributed to just a handful 
of MPs. For example, the stated financial assets in 2013 for the MP who ranked second 
highest were greater than the assets of 295 other MPs combined, at over BDT 3,600 
million. The MP with the highest amount of financial assets in 2013 claimed BDT 32,500 
million. Such a disparity is either indicative of a very high level of inequality among MPs 
in terms of financial assets or a lack of accuracy of the data.  
Figure 3-24  Average Financial Assets of MPs, by 2014 Election Result, 
without the Top 5, in BDT
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For the data in Figure 3-24, we remove the top five MPs in terms of their assets, in 
both 2013 and 2008. This meant that 2 MP observations and 3 MP observations were 
removed from the re-elected and ‘other’ groups respectively in 2013, and 3 MPs and 2 
MPs were removed respectively for 2008.
In this figure, the average assets for MPs rise by 117%, from BDT 5.1 million to BDT 11.1 
million. The re-elected group in 2008 augmented their average financial assets from BDT 
4.0 million to BDT 10.2 million, an increase of 157 percent. Meanwhile, the ‘other’ group 
in 2013 held an average of BDT 11.9 million in assets, up 99 percent from BDT 6.0 
million in 2008. These averages and percentage increases are still substantial, but more 
modest than the increases seen when including the top five holders of financial assets for 
both years.
Criminal Records
The affidavit forms require that MPs declare whether they are either currently under criminal 
investigation or have been convicted of a crime previously. The severity of the crimes 
committed is not available in this data. The vast majority of MPs in both years declare 
having no criminal record, though again there is a downward bias to this information, 
with the possibility of failing to report such cases.  
Table 3-1 Criminal Statistics of MPs in 2008 and 2013
2008 2013
Current Cases 256 34
MPs with Current Cases 80 17
Convictions 4 3
In 2008, 80 MPs faced criminal charges, under a total of 256 cases. Just four MPs had 
been previously convicted of a crime, however, one crime for each convicted MP. One 
MP from the 9th Parliament in 2008 faced 17 criminal charges, and two faced thirteen 
charges each. These numbers dropped dramatically in 2013. Just 17 MPs faced criminal 
charges, for a total of 34 cases. Only three had been convicted of a crime in 2013.
The data on each of these criminal aspects of MPs suggests that there was a large decrease 
in current criminal cases. The reason for this is not clear, as it may be due to dropping the 
cases during the 9th parliament, a failure to convict, a failure to declare, or the reduced 
efforts of government to launch new cases against MPs during the time period.
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Conclusions
The main focus of this analysis is on the declaration forms of MP candidates, submitted in 
2008 and 2013, and limited to the 300 territorial MPs who were elected in the general 
elections of 2008 and 2014. The main observations emerging from the analysis of these 
forms are the following:
1.  The MP asset data is highly flawed, and requires an improved a verification process. 
As mentioned, there are a number of items in the forms that are not completed, or 
have unbelievable results, such as zero income. MPs will also have a bias for under-
reporting income and assets. Further issues are presented in Appendix 1. As a result, 
the results of our analysis may not accurately reflect reality.
2.  Across the board, there are dramatic increases in the assets of MPs from 2008 to 
2013, whether financial assets, land, gold or income. The most dramatic increase is in 
the area of financial assets – including securities, bonds and savings amongst others, 
where the average MP held 5,136 percent more in 2013 than in 2008. The average 
aggregate income of MPs rose 324 percent during the same time period, with growth 
primarily in business income, at 491 percent. Parliamentarians held 21.7 percent 
more gold on average in 2013 than in 2008, and 20 percent more land in the same 
period. Inflation during the period, as measured by the CPI, was approximately 44.4 
percent.
3.  The assets and income of territorial MPs, as well as the growth in these income and 
assets, is highly skewed to the wealthiest MPs. The analysis mainly breaks this down 
by quintile, showing top-most quintile of MPs earned an average aggregated income 
that was 41 times that of the bottom quintile in 2008, which increased to 126 times in 
2013. The amount of gold owned by one MP increased from 30 to 1,144 bhori, and 
the other from 10 to 870 bhori. The MP with the highest amount of financial assets in 
2013 held BDT 32,500 million, while the MP owning the second highest amount of 
financial assets in 2013 exceeded the assets of 295 other MPs, at over BDT 3,600 
million.
4.  The analysis divided MPs into two groups, MPs re-elected in 2014 and an ‘others’ 
group, showing that the groups generally experienced comparable increases in wealth 
over time, with some variation. For the re-elected MPs, the increase of aggregate 
annual income was 355 percent from 2008 to 2013, and 292 percent for the ‘other’ 
group. The growth in estimated annual income for re-elected and ‘other’ groups was 
both large and slightly differing, at 227 and 403 percent respectively. After removing 
the top five MPs in terms of financial assets, the re-elected group augmented their 
financial assets by 157 percent from 2008 to 2013, while the ‘other’ group increased 
by 99 percent when compared to their predecessors during the same time period. 
Meanwhile, the growth in land from 2008 to 2013 was large for MPs in the re-elected 
group, but not for ‘others’.   
5.  The number of MPs with criminal charges, and the total number of criminal charges 
for parliamentarians, declined from 2008 to 2013. There were 256 cases against 80 
MPs in 2008, which diminished to just 34 cases against 17 MPs.  
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The analysis raises a number of questions for further research and debate. First, the 
weaknesses in the asset declaration system deserve to be further examined. We 
have provided a short summary of such limitations and made suggestions for further 
improvements in Appendix 1. Further technical analysis and ideas for improvement should 
be conducted for the next round of elections, to ensure high quality data and accurate 
information for transparency among politicians.  
Second, the obvious topic for research is to explain the large increases in assets and 
income among many MPs. For most variables, even the bottom quintile saw a large rise. 
Many MPs also did this while in office, with large increases also found among the other 
groups. As such, future research and investigation should inquire into what is driving 
these increases in income, land, gold and financial assets. Direct involvement in politics, 
or even simple political connections, may play an important role here. Such evidence also 
means that mastaan-like activities, especially land grabbing, may be involved as well, a 
hypothesis that deserves further scrutiny.
Research should particularly scrutinize how a select few MPs are able to grow their assets 
and income at very high rates. This is particularly true in the area of financial assets, 
including securities, bonds and savings bonds. However, in practically every variable, 
there was an extreme increase among the top quintile or the top few MPs. Clearly, some 
MPs are able to improve their financial situation much more than others; comparing their 
activities in constituencies would better enlighten these questions.  
Furthermore, research should investigate whether MPs use their position in public office for 
personal gain, whether to earn land, gold, income or financial assets. The data suggest 
that newly joined MPs in the 10th parliament did not have a strikingly lower set of assets 
in any of these areas, though this could be due to their relatively good connection with 
the party in power, or because wealthier individuals are becoming more likely to enter 
politics. The relatively strong growth in financial assets and business income point to 
efforts by MPs to increase their wealth while in office.  
The large decline in criminal cases is also an important topic of study, particularly with 
the view to mastaans and criminality in politics. It is possible that fewer MPs with criminal 
records have become MPs, that the cases launched previously did not end in a conviction, 
that MPs are not fully reporting, or that the government is not as eager to pursue court 
cases against MPs. The frequent violence associated with politics in recent times, and 
the court cases being launched against politically active individuals, most of whom are 
found in parties opposing the current party in power, raise questions as to when and how 
politicians are prosecuted for crimes.
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4.  The Nexus of Mastaans and Politicians 
in Land Grabbing and Political 
Violence: Two Case Studies on Local 
Power Structures
Introduction
This chapter describes the nexus of actors, especially politicians and mastaans, involved 
in two main forms of criminal activities in Bangladesh: land grabbing and political 
violence.  Land grabbing is a common occurrence in Bangladesh, particularly grabbing 
of khas (government owned) land.  Despite national legislation that dictates that such 
land should be provided to the poor landless, other powerful figures often take control of 
the land.  However, private lands are often stolen as well; a recent survey of legal issues 
of the general population identified property disputes as the most common legal issue 
among Bangladeshis. Political violence is also a common occurrence in Bangladesh as 
well.  Citizens were shocked by the abundance of violence in the streets during the lead 
up to the 2014 parliamentary and Upazila elections.  
According to a survey conducted in seven constituencies as part of this research project, 
both politicians and mastaans are heavily involved in land grabbing and political violence. 
In these constituencies, land grabbing is the most common form of economically related 
criminal activity, generally focused on khas land.  Political violence is similarly a fairly 
frequent occurrence across the constituencies.
The chapter presents case studies of two constituencies found in the survey, and focuses 
on the mechanics of and actors involved in land grabbing and political violence. Our 
team identified the two constituencies because of the strong presence and power of 
mastaans, based on the survey conducted as part of this research project. From the case 
studies, several observations emerge. First, a culture of fear prevails in the two case 
study areas, among both journalists and the local population. This meant that it was quite 
challenging to develop full and accurate stories regarding all of the individuals involved 
in the criminal activities. Second, the cases highlight how the prosperous industries of 
housing and shrimp farming lead to a premium on land that inspires actors to grab land, 
often using violence. Also, the actors driving major instances of land grabbing vary, at 
times local individuals such as businesses, and at other times, national conglomerates. All 
the actors, though, must work closely with the local power structures in order to grab land. 
Third, land owners who are at risk of land grabbing may organize and, if conditions are 
right, successfully halt land grabbing; such organizing does not occur with khas land, 
however, putting that land at greater risk. Fourth, political violence is committed on both 
sides of the political divide; these cases highlight that mastaan-ism and party supporters, 
especially in the student and youth leagues, overlap substantially.    
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Method of the case studies
Study design
This part of the research project presents a qualitative study of mastaans in two 
constituencies. The qualitative method allows for a more precise scrutiny of mastaans, 
whether their background, activities, connection with politicians, involvement in local 
political organizations and others. The survey conducted as part of this research project 
highlighted important lessons on mastaans in a variety of settings, but was limited by its 
quantitative measures in terms of providing detailed information along these dimensions. 
The study employed the use of primary and secondary data. Primary data was 
qualitatively gathered through key informant interviews and focus group discussions. 
At least 75 key informant interviews were held with persons from the government and 
civil society including councilors, Members of Parliament, local government technocrats, 
central government officials, CSO representatives and community members. A further five 
focus group discussions were held with various citizen project committees, government 
teams and community groups. The interviews and focus group discussions were guided 
by semi-structured questionnaires. The team conducted site visits for each of the cases, 
with interviews took place between December 2013 and July 2014. Secondary data was 
gathered through a desk review of available newspaper articles.
Main sources of information included secondary sources such as newspaper articles, as 
well as a series of interviews with a variety of stakeholders. Journalists served as an initial 
source of information, in both selected particular events to scrutinize as well as details 
from those events. However, our team also spoke to victims of land grabbing and violence, 
political actors from both sides, and also business people, civil society and others. These 
interviews at times were conducted using a semi structured questionnaire, but sometimes 
were open ended when attempting to capture the spectrum of events occurring in the 
constituency.  
Case selection
Cases selected because they have the highest ratings for the level of mastaan power in the 
journalist survey conducted as part of this research. Out of a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 
suggests that mastaans have no power and 5 suggest they are extremely powerful, Case 
1 rated 4.08 and Case 2 rated 4.09. These were the highest rankings among the seven 
sites in which the survey was conducted. These two examples also provide an interesting 
contrast between a largely rural constituency in Case 2 and a peri-urban constituency of 
Case 1.
Within each case, our team sought to highlight mastaan power through an analysis of 
several instances of land grabbing and political violence. Land grabbing was selected 
because it was identified in our survey as the most common and profitable form of crime 
in both constituencies, with mastaans involved heavily. Meanwhile, our team looked 
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at political violence, as mastaans were identified as being heavily involved. Both land 
grabbing and political violence would further highlight the participation of mastaans in 
politics, whether through connections with politicians or involvement in political activities. 
Our team identified the examples within each of the cases through a consultation with 
journalists. Our team interviewed four local journalists/correspondents representing 
national media and asked them to rank the top three land grabbing cases and political 
violence incidents in the last decade. For land grabbing, they were told to consider 
incidents that attracted wider public attention and extensively reported in media. For 
political violence, our team requested that journalists rank the incidents according to 1) 
the incidents must be of intra-party or inter-party violence, 2) the number of casualty, and 
3) the grievous nature of the violence.
A major limitation to the study: a culture of fear
While journalists presented controversial views regarding politicians and mastaans in 
the anonymous survey conducted as part of this project, they were reluctant to present 
such views in key informant interviews. Interviews with journalists at the national level 
suggested that many journalists at the local level receive payment for favorable press 
coverage, thus providing them with an incentive to avoid mentioning controversial views. 
However, a more powerful disincentive seemed to be the culture of fear imposed on 
journalists, whether through violence or court cases.  
For example, in an interview, one journalist pointed out the following:
 We know the reality—what we can do and what we cannot. We, the journalists in 
[this area], know that this is a dangerous area. That’s why we maintain the balance. 
Sometimes we are directly `requested’ by politicians not to report any particular 
incidents and we maintain that. This is the style here. I report against drug use and 
trade numerous times, but the matter of the fact is drugs are sold right in the backyard 
of my own building and I cannot report that. Because I have a teenage sister and my 
family and I cannot risk their lives.
Journalists cited another incident in 2008 in Case 1, where correspondents from three 
papers were attacked. They had recently covered a land grabbing incident, highlighting 
that local politicians were involved. They were attacked by assailants they identified as 
being tied with the local political leadership, 
Seven journalists in the Case 1 constituency faced legal charges for publishing land 
grabbing incidents in recent times. Even if the court cases find journalists innocent, they 
are taxing in terms of financial costs and mental strain. The prosecution process takes a 
long time, and journalists have to appear before the court numerous times in their defense. 
This embodies the cumbersome legal procedures that harass people irrespective of their 
social or political height. Hiring good lawyers and pursuing a legal battle is extremely 
expensive relative to the income of journalists; one journalist claimed that he had to spend 
more than 70 thousand taka for the entire process—until the disposal of his case.
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The Two Cases
Table 4-1  Characteristics of the Two Case Study Constituencies
Case Name by Division Description Economic Activity
Case 1: Dhaka Constituency Peri Urban
Small commerce, small scale gar-
ment production
Case 2: Khulna Constituency Rural/ Coastal Agriculture, shrimp farming
In both cases, according to the survey conducted as part of the research, the two cases 
were rated as having the highest level of mastaan activity. However, as indicated in 
Table 4-1, the two cases contrast sharply along a number of characteristics. As such, they 
present an interesting set of cases for comparison.  
Case 1: Overview
Case 1 is a constituency located just outside the Dhaka Metropolitan Area, in which 
the urban population is undergoing high growth rates. As a result, it is not surprising 
that the population density in the area is elevated. Population numbers specific to the 
constituency are not available, but Case 1 plus another constituency make up the Upazila. 
The population density of the Upazila increased 31 percent from 2001.
The local economy is varied. Services make up the bulk of the local economy, along with 
a number of small manufacturing units. There are a growing number of garment factories; 
the local garment owners association claims to have over 4,000 members, ranging from 
just a few machines to over 200 machines. There are several hundred brick factories in 
the area, mainly serving the construction boom in the area. Meanwhile, there is still a 
small level of agricultural production in the area, mainly rice, as well as fishing in the 
local rivers. However, both of these forms of employment are in decline given the rapid 
urbanization in the area.  
The main local organizations include a variety of NGOs, including BRAC, Grameen 
Bank, ASA, and the Sajeda Foundation. Local worker organizations are few, and mainly 
include two: a Bus Owners’ Association and a Bus/CNG/Truck Drivers’ Association.  
Criminality in the constituency
According to the survey conducted as part of this research project, crime rates in the area 
of Case 1 are high relative to other constituencies. The average law and order rating is 
at 3.6 on a scale of 1 (crime never happens) to 5 (crime is very bad), the highest rating 
in the survey conducted.  
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Survey evidence suggests that the major criminal activities include land grabbing, drug 
dealing and extortion. According to the survey, nearly all journalists (95.8 percent) 
identified land grabbing as both the most common and profitable form of crime for profit 
in the area. Land grabbing, in which mastaans are heavily involved, is analyzed below. 
The vast majority of journalists identified drug dealing as among the most common (79.2 
percent) and most profitable (91.7 percent) forms of crime for profit. For drug sales, 
only wine, beer, phensedyl, and ganja were previously among the main illegal drugs. 
Now, new variations have been added. They include Baba, Yaba, Shisha, Jin, Raja, and 
Badsha. These drugs are small tablets that can be carried easily. The set of rivers passing 
through the area make drug trading easy and cost-effective due to the immediate transport 
links.  
Extortion appeared third in the survey ranking. 45.8 percent of journalists recognized 
it as among the most common forms of crime for profit, and 50.0 percent as the most 
profitable forms of crime for profit. Extortion is not focused on the whole population, 
but rather focused on the business community. Local political figures interviewed for this 
project claim that a primary form of extortion is forcing the business community to pay for 
political programs. Such extortion is rarely reported to the authorities.
The land market
The characteristics of the land market in the Case 1 area is intimately tied to the 
urbanization process in the area. As is typical with urbanization globally, there has been 
a large increase in demand for residential housing, especially apartments for rent, as 
well as shops and production facilities. As the stories below highlight, the demand for 
real estate also drives up the prices, creating huge rents up for grabs. The question then 
becomes, who captures the real estate profits generated by urbanization? Theoretically, 
it should be the previous landowners, many of whom have held the land for generations. 
However, given the profits involved, this scenario happens rarely, with land grabbers and 
real estate interests often paying below market rates – if anything – for land, and selling 
for higher prices.  
Not surprisingly, there are now many real estate business houses in Case 1 area. Our 
team identified at least four national real estate businesses operating in the area. Many of 
the owners of these companies were originally poor landless people, who have worked 
the system – often in illegal ways – in order to generate huge profits. The analysis below 
captures some of the various tactics used to capture the profits from land, through land 
grabbing or forced sales, development and re-selling.
Case 2: Overview
Case 2 is located in the Khulna Division. The constituency is defined by its extensive 
Sundarban geography, which is defined by its numerous small islands and tropical 
wetlands. The local economy is most noted for its large shrimp farming business. There are 
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thousands of small shrimp farms in the constituency, mainly produced for export. Thousands 
are employed as day laborers in these shrimp farms. Fishing production is large as well, 
with thousands of fish farms as well as thousands of fishermen employed in capture fishing 
among the waterways and the coastline. Employment in the city mainly stems from the 
service sector, including trading and small businesses, and a small manufacturing sector. 
Agriculture is mainly focused on auto-consumption, but also includes crops such as rice 
and seasonal vegetables, as well as poultry and coconuts.
Aside from politics, the main local organizations include BRAC, Grameen Bank, ASHA, 
Bureau Bangladesh, Jagorani Chakra, Al-Din Foundation, Nabolok, Ahsania Mission, and 
Caritas. There are shrimp and fish associations as well. There is a business association, 
an auto-rickshaw owners’ cooperative association and a drivers’ association. There is 
also a social welfare youth organization in the area.
Criminality in the constituency
According to the survey conducted as part of this research project, crime rates in the area 
of Case 2 are high relative to other constituencies. The average law and order rating is at 
3.4 on a scale of 1 (crime never happens) to 5 (crime is very bad), which is tied for the 
second highest rating in the survey conducted.  
As with Case 1, survey evidence suggests that the major criminal activities in the Case 2 
area include land grabbing, drug dealing and extortion. According to the survey, nearly 
all journalists (87.2 percent and 89.4 percent respectively) identified land grabbing as 
the most common and profitable form of crime for profit in the area. Land grabbing, in 
which mastaans are heavily involved, is analyzed below.
A majority of journalists identified drug dealing as among the most common (61.7 percent) 
and most profitable (72.3 percent) forms of crime for profit. For drug sales, alcohol, 
phensedyl, ganja and heroin are the main illegal drugs. The coastal characteristics of the 
area, as well as extensive rivers and waterways and a port city in a neighboring district 
where smuggling is rampant, means that the drug trade is easy and cost-effective.  
Extortion appeared third in the survey ranking. 57.4 percent of journalists recognized 
it as among the most common forms of crime for profit, and 59.6 percent as the most 
profitable forms of crime for profit. Extortion is not focused on the whole population, 
but rather focused on the business community. Local political figures interviewed for this 
project claim that a primary form of extortion is forcing the business community to pay for 
political programs. Such extortion is rarely reported to the authorities.
   
The land market
While there is a small urban area in the constituency, the main source of valuable 
real estate in the constituency is from shrimp farms. Bangladesh ranks among the top 
ten exporters of shrimp worldwide, employing over 1.2 million workers presently and 
representing approximately 4 percent of national GDP. The Case 2 area is one of the 
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main shrimp farming regions of Bangladesh. Property is key in this lucrative business, as 
shrimp farms require only limited investments for production. As a result, land grabbing in 
the area focuses primarily on the shrimp farms, a practice that can lead to large profits in 
the short term. Such land grabbing may focus on land suitable for shrimp farming, or on 
shrimp farms that are currently cultivated. The precise methods used are analyzed below.
Land grabbing in the cases
Case one: three examples of land grabbing
To explore the role of the nexus in the main criminal activity of the constituency, land, 
the research perused three of the most prominent examples of land grabbing in the 
constituency in the last decade.
Example 1:
A canal in the Case 1 area has been the focus of extensive land grabbing. Local estimates 
vary regarding its length, from five kilometers to ten kilometers. It connects the two major 
rivers in the area, and was originally built for the irrigation purpose and also served as 
a waterway for local residents. Previously, the canal was mainly bordered by agricultural 
fields.
However, the process of urbanization has dramatically changed the area. Whereas 
previously the canal served the agricultural fields, the canal is primarily bordered by 
residential buildings and shops, a process that began around the 1990s. At present, only 
a small part is still agricultural.  
Along with urbanization, extensive land grabbing took place, whereby the local residents 
would occupy the canal space with structures. According to local residents and journalists, 
the land grabbing started in the early 1990s, but intensified greatly during 2000 to 2006. 
In general, the main process of land grabbing was that residents would build extensions 
of buildings into the canal area. People living beside the canal-bank first erect 8-15 feet 
bamboo structures as foundations on the canal and then gradually build concrete edifices 
on the bamboo structure. These buildings vary from a single floor to several floors.  
Grabbing took three main forms. First, people residing beside the canal bank push their 
residence boundary to several feet and gradually demark that as their own.  Second, locals 
filled in the part of the canal to develop pathways across the canal. Third, local influential 
politicians grab the empty space and erect markets and shops for rent, particularly where 
there are not previous residents whose property does not already border the canal. Many 
local residents living beside the canals also grabbed the canal to build markets.
As mentioned, local influential politicians tend to be among the largest land grabbers. 
According local residents, the local Organizing Secretary of the ruling party is one of 
the largest grabbers, having occupied an area of the canal to erect a market of 15 
shops. These shops are rented for small-size garments factories, grocery shops, and 
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miscellaneous purposes. A garments factory manager claimed that he paid BDT 30,000 
advance to the building owner to rent of the place.
During the 2007-08 Caretaker Government, an eviction attempt was taken to reclaim the 
canal. The then administration, led by the military personnel, demolished 186 facilities 
spreading across 3 kilometers of the canal. However, after the change in government in 
2009, the grabbing started once again. The old grabbers retook the possession of their 
earlier structures and erected new facilities including shops and markets.  
The changes to the canal have been stark. Locals interviewed admitted that the both banks 
of the canals were squeezed and the width of the canal is now reduced to 3-4 feet from 
a width of 15 feet found a decade ago. The effects of the canal encroachment on the 
local residents and environment are mixed. Although the canal has lost its relevance in 
terms of irrigation and waterways that transported commercial cargo boats, it has been 
to some extent worked as a large sewerage for the local residents. Besides, during the 
rainy season, the canal worked as a reservoir and flowed most of the excess water to the 
local rivers. 
Example 2:
This case of land grabbing was conducted under the guise of a residential project from 
a local firm, located 10 kilometers from the main urban center of the area. However, the 
project itself was made up of two parts. Both projects have grabbed agricultural and 
private lands. There is no government khas land in the project site. They grabbed most of 
the land during 2005-2013 periods.
The company was started by an individual who, along with some friends, established a 
multi-purpose cooperative society, a private savings scheme, and started collecting money 
from the local population. After several years in business, he and his team developed this 
housing project. He is not a political figure at any level, but for survival, he has been using 
local politicians as a cover.
The interviewees, who included journalists, local residents and local officials, identified 
three ways that the company employed to grab lands. First, they threaten and use force 
against weak land owners to sell their land to the company, and forcibly sand-filled lands 
of other owners. Second, they purchase a few plots here and there and earth-filled them. 
When filling earth, they deliberately filled the adjacent lands of other owners so that the 
landowners are compelled to sell those lands to the company. Third, the company bribes 
the Surveyor of local land office, who then harasses the local landowners with fake 
registry and deeds. The landowners are then offered to sell their lands to the company, 
to live in peace.  
The company first bought a few bighas of lands in the first project site in 2006. Soon 
afterwards, the company put up signboards in all adjacent lands, indicating the lands 
were available to let. They demonstrated these signboards to the prospective plot-renters 
misrepresenting their project size. In mid-2007, actual landowners started protesting 
against the company and asked it to remove the signboards from their lands. They sat 
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with the owner of the real estate company to find a settlement. In mid-2009, the company 
finally removed all the signboards illegally put up in private lands.
In the first locations, the company purchased only 3.5 bighas of lands but it put up 
signboards on more than 450 bighas of lands illegally. It deceived the landowners, who 
were most of the time farmers, by saying that the signboards are rented and nothing 
will happen to them. The company also did not have any permission or proper license 
to operate. Later the farmers and landowners discovered that the company was selling 
their lands to the buyers misrepresenting the ownership. The locals protested against the 
company. At the same time, the project did not receive administrative approval. As a 
result, the company abandoned the project.  
The second project, which occurred adjacent to the first, presented an incident that 
illustrates the strong-arm tactics involved in land grabbing. According to the victims, in 
December 2012, the company illegally earth-filled 13 decimal lands, owned by three 
local residents who are brothers. The brothers also owned another 208 decimal lands 
attached to that 13 decimal. They feared that the company would also earth-filled their 
remaining lands. One brother sued the company. Local agents of the company were 
infuriated at the case filing, taking up the matter with the local ruling party supporters. The 
ruling party supporters threatened the brothers to withdraw the case and sell their lands. 
They threatened that if the case was not withdrawn and the lands sold to the company, he 
and his brothers would be in jail under ‘false case’; even the ruling party leaders made 
threats. The supporters also warned them that if their request was not entertained, the 
brothers would have to leave the locality. The brothers refused this request.  
On October 2012, in a local mediation, the local ruling party supporters beat the son 
of one brother with clubs and sticks, pressuring him to withdraw the case and sell the 
land to the company. The son suffered injuries in his legs and many parts of his body 
swelled receiving indiscriminate beating. He was immediately taken to the local hospital 
for treatment. Finally, succumbed to pressure, on June 2013, the brothers sold their 13 
decimal lands at only BDT 500,000, below from the normal price of BDT 1.2 million for 
the same land. The rest 208 decimal lands were sold at only BDT 20.8 million—lowered 
from the market price of BDT 30.12 million. They accepted the lower price given the 
immense pressure and in face of the threat to drive them out from the village.  
Roughly 150 families have been affected by the housing project; lands of about 100 
families are illegally sand-filled by the housing authority. Currently, the company has 
developed the residential areas, and sold a majority of plots in the area, with some work 
remaining.
Example 3:
This case highlights several characteristics of land grabbing. First, national conglomerates 
often enter booming real estate markets, using a variety of tactics to land grab in the 
area. Second, these tactics are varied, using mastaans for threats and violence, political 
and administrative connections for legitimacy, and a process of negotiation with local 
landowners to capture huge areas of land for windfall profits. Third, the role of local 
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organization along with favorable national conditions can thwart the extent of land 
grabbing.
The land grabbing occurred in a location around a kilometer from the main city center, 
in two residential projects of the company that were just two kilometers from each other. 
In the first project, the land grabbing occurred in the early 2000s when the current 
opposition was in power both nationally and locally. Here, the project covered over 200 
acres, many of which were grabbed from both private individuals and the government. 
In the second project, which began in 2010, the company sought to repeat its earlier 
tactics; it quickly acquired over 100 bighas of lands through purchase and grabbing. 
However, in the face of local resistance through a local social welfare association, as well 
as opposition from the national level, the project development now came to a halt. The 
project site is sand-filled and company initially sold some plots; but now land acquisition 
has stopped as the company agreed with the association not to expand further.
The company is a conglomerate, where real estate represents one of main businesses, with 
projects throughout the country. The company started the first project in the Case 1 area in 
2001. Initially it purchased 2 acres of lands. Soon after the initial purchase, the company 
had a strategy to expand rapidly that focused on 1. Grabbing khas (government-owned) 
and fallow land, and 2. Grabbing outright or purchase at a discount lands from private 
individuals. Unfortunately, no land records were available to confirm the total size of the 
project, nor the amount of khas or private land taken for the project. Locals said that in the 
first project area, the majority of land was khas land, and a minority private land. Most 
of the khas land, as well as some of the private land, was described as beel, which is 
land that is under water for almost nine months a year. During that time, local fishermen 
captured fishes of various kinds to maintain the living. Only during the summer, local 
farmers used to cultivate paddy in the beel.  Unfortunately, despite a visit to the local 
government, land records or information on khas lands were not available in order to 
document the precise amount of land that may have been grabbed.  
For private individuals, the company used a variety of tactics to expand. These include 
outright purchase, sand filling, intimidation and others. Sand filling meant that the 
company would pump sand from the riverbed into the lands, thus making them useless 
for agriculture or fishing. For example, one victim living in the first project site told our 
research team that he lost nearly two acres of lands in 2005 after the company sand-filled 
his lands. He never agreed to sell them and still he has not received his lands back or 
received compensation. According to local residents, such cases were more exceptional.
Local residents emphasized the importance of political connections, where local politicians 
would mobilize their mastaans in support of the land grabbing. One local resident stated 
that “[the company] couldn’t forcibly sand-filled a single decimal of land without the help 
of local mastaans and politicians led by the Upazila Chairman.” Another local resident 
claimed, “The Upazila Chairman was none but a bandit but he made nearly 300 crores 
of taka by helping [the company] grab khas lands.”
While capturing the mastaan-like activities from the past is difficult, several residents 
provided accounts of events. For example, one family who fell victim to land grabbing 
from the company lost 16 decimals of land. The father was a cashier in a local bank and 
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is currently retired. In one night in early 2010, the company sand-filled the family lands 
and all other nearby lands using a dredger machine connected to the river. Landowners 
were not even informed what was going on.
According to members of this family, the father immediately contacted the UP chairman 
(now deceased) and the local agents of the company, receiving assurances that he would 
get the actual compensation for his land – which was BDT 4 million (2.5 lac per decimal). 
But the UP chairman and the company never followed up. When the father contacted the 
UP chairman again reminding him the deal, the chairman offered him BDT 800,000 for 
the total land (50,000 per decimal) and threatened to hand over the ownership through 
deed-registry. When the father refused to sell and visited his plot to re-demarcate, the 
chairman and his associates threatened violence to him if he pursues that further. Fearing 
the consequence of the threat, the father went to local police station to file a general diary, 
but police refused to entertain. The same night the Chairman’s men went to the family 
residence and threatened to kill all of his family members if the father did not back off. 
According to this account, the family still has not been compensated for the land.  
One experience illustrates the variety of experiences. In 2003, the company illegally sand-
filled more than 3 acres (300 decimals) of lands of a well-known industrialist. He said 
that when the company illegally and indiscriminately took over this land, he mobilized 
the local people who were also victims of illegal grabbing. Because he was a known 
industrialist with political connections, the company instantly offered him the market price 
to settle the matter, using local politicians to arbitrate the matter. He insisted that he wants 
the compensation for the villagers too, but after two years of pressure, he settled in 2005, 
selling his land at more than the market price to compensate for the lands that had been 
already stolen. But he could not secure the market price most of the villagers.
After acquiring the land, the company developed it in the following way. In most cases, 
the company used large pumps connected to the riverbed, then depositing the sand from 
that riverbed throughout the area. The company would then design the area, paving the 
streets, inserting basic service lines, and preparing each of the properties for re-sale.  
There are complexities for the purchasers of real estate from the company, as the 
majority of the plots in the first project had been khas land. As such, they do not have the 
appropriate legal documentation. Private purchases have legal documents and the group 
owns them—though they comprise less than half of the project. According to the Secretary 
of a local social welfare association, the company managed to sell plots to hundreds of 
buyers, but gave proper registry or deed-documents to only a handful number of them. 
The remaining buyers have been awaited for long and the company does not provide the 
buyers real information that the legal ownership of the lands is debated.  
Local residents told our research team that since the company grabbed land amidst the 
water-body and developed the project, there are negative effects in three main areas. 
First, biodiversity is affected, with few fish and birds in the area. Second, fishermen have 
been excluded from fishing in an area where they had historical access. Third, there is 
now water-clogging in the area, which the interviewees never saw before. Since the Beel 
that was the reservoir of the water in that area was grabbed and later developed, local 
drainage system now cannot take the pressure of the water during the rainy season, 
leading to flooding in the area.
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Protests against illegal land grabbing by the company started in 2001—the same time 
the company started its first project. However, the company, particularly with the support 
of the local UP chair, paid little attention to the demand of landowners and continued 
grabbing private lands forcefully. The support from politicians from 2001-06 meant that 
local landowners could not lead a joint movement against the company, as they received 
intimidation and threats from the local political leaders. Therefore, they tried to protests 
sporadically, but failed to influence the overall situation.
In the end, the company earned large profits in the project. Our research team interviewed 
several sellers and buyers regarding the prices paid. Seller 1 was a business owner who 
sold 300 decimals of land at BDT 25,000 per decimal in 2003. Referring to the land 
prices mentioned below, the market price for per decimal land was BDT 20,000. While 
the businessman got more than the market price, he said that the company paid poor 
landowners BDT 5,000 to 10,000 for each decimal of land, according to local residents.
Meanwhile, Seller 2 was a local resident who owned 26 decimals of lands. When the 
company sand-filled his lands in 2005, it offered him two options: a) BDT 35,000 per 
decimal, or b) a 8.25 decimals land plot in exchange. This may be compared with the 
selling price of BDT 150,000 per decimal for new purchasers.
The price, at which new purchasers may purchase land, indicates the growth in land 
prices. A local reporter purchased 5 decimals of land at BDT 100,000 per decimal for 
the lowest priced plots in 2004. The VIP plots (front plots) were offered to him at BDT 
212,000 per decimal. Then, in 2013, a local journalist bought 8.25 decimals of land 
at BDT 1,200,000 per decimal. When compared to the market sale price in 2003 of 
BDT 20,000, this represents an increase of 600 percent, or six times (though it does not 
capture the development and other costs associated with the land, as well as inflation).
In the second project site, the company originally purchased land, compensating the 
landowners, though there are contentions about the compensation. They then proceed to 
sand fill 200 bighas of land in the area, including a large area that was not their property. 
As local residents had already witnessed the first project, and the coming of the second 
one, they took action.  
A local social welfare association is an association of private landowners that resisted the 
company’s illegal expansion of its project on private lands. Only in 2009, with the change 
in power, seven landowners came forward and formed an association of landowners. It 
started activism against the company’s land grabbing through forming human chain at the 
local highway. By 2010, the association had increased its membership to 170 in total. In 
2014, the association has 611 members and the landowners of the association own 200 
bighas (equivalent to 6,600 decimals) of lands in the area of the second project, including 
a majority of private land that the company sought to acquire.
The association’s main activities have been, over the years, to protest the company 
attempts to encroach their lands for its second project. The association has done this 
through staging protests, including human chains and press conferences. Their main point 
of meeting and demonstration was a local highway. The association members meet every 
Friday in their office. The secretary of the association confirmed that media presence was 
critical to their strategy. The landowners also tried to seek legal remedies and filed more 
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than 250 general diaries at the local police station against the company.
Two dynamics helped to reinforce the position of the association without which the 
association itself believes that it could not succeed. The first dynamic is the negative media 
coverage of the company. The editor of a newspaper is reputed to be an adversary of the 
company, as evidenced by continually negative coverage of the land grabbing practices 
of a variety of company projects. When the association was formed, they immediately 
found extensive coverage in this media outlet. A local journalist confirmed that even a 
handful number of protesters showing placards against the company were given pictorial 
coverage in the daily, which in other cases might not happen.  
The second dynamic is at the political front. The company thrived while the current 
opposition was in power in the early 2000s. The company’s major breakthrough occurred 
in the early 1990s, in a housing project near Dhaka city. One daily reported that the 
company made as high as 3,500 percent in profits in the project. Accordingly during the 
early 2000s, with the protection of the now opposition party, the group implemented its 
first project in the area.  However, this strong support shifted radically under the Caretaker 
Government and then the arrival of the current party in power. The secretary of the 
association unequivocally said: “the association still stands only because of the political 
cover it receives from the [current government’s] top leadership. If [the opposition] comes 
back to power, [the company] will not take a moment to encroach all our lands and the 
deal will face a dead end.”
The company, failing to rally support - whether political, social or media - turned to the 
association to work out a settlement. There was an agreement between the company and 
the association to prevent further expansion of the development project. The association’s 
current strategy is to maintain the agreement, survive and live peacefully and develop the 
community.  
The specific terms of the agreement are as follows. Among the 500 bighas of developable 
lands in the area, the company will develop 50 percent of the lands (the land owners with 
plots that immediately surrounding the company project site their lands to the company 
at market price) and the remaining 50 percent will belong to the association members. 
Neither party will fill in the canal that flows through the project areas, which will serve 
as a natural boundary whereby the company will develop its project to the north of the 
canal, nor will association members keep their lands on the north side. Also, as part of 
the development to the north of the canal, the association members agreed to swap 35 
bighas of their lands in the south side of the canal for 28 bighas of lands that the company 
purchased from other land owners in the north side of the canal.
So far, both sides have respected the terms and implemented the agreement. However, 
the Secretary fears that any change in regime could risk the agreement. According to him, 
the company might not honor the agreement if a government favorable to the company 
returns to power, and it might also start expanding further north and encroach lands of 
the association.
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Case two: two examples of land grabbing
Example 1: 
Another individual, who is a prominent political figure at the district level under the current 
party in power experienced land grabbing in 2003. At that time, parliament was headed 
by the present day opposition political party. Soon after the opposition took power in 
2001, the many local political operatives fled the area for fear of reprisal. When doing 
so, they left their assets behind, even their homes and fields. In one instance, several 
individuals, including the general secretary of the youth front, the union party leader, 
and the former chairman of the UP, took control of the shrimp farms of this individual. 
According to local journalists, there was no direct violence involved, as the farms had 
already been abandoned due to fear of reprisal from the party. The size of the farms 
included 22 bighas, or just over 7 acres. In 2008, once the present day ruling party took 
over, their political operatives returned to the area and reclaimed their lands.  As such, 
the grabbing was reversed at that time. 
Example 2:
Again, after the change in government in 2001, another notable local politician fled, a 
vice president of the union party organization, and cousin of a local UP chair.  He owned 
15 bighas, or approximately 5 acres of land. According to local journalists, the main 
perpetrator was the general secretary of the district youth front for the then party in power, 
allied with a nearby local UP chair. In 2002, after he fled the area, they took control of 
his fish farms and began to use it for their own profit. As with the previous case, upon the 
change in government in 2008, the owner returned and re-possessed the fish farms for 
his own use.     
Political violence in the cases
Case one: examples of political violence
The journalists struggled to find such cases from recent past as the political violence 
reduced over the last decade for a number of reasons. They have only come up with 
the following illustrious political violence incidents both of which demonstrate inter-party 
violence between the two major political parties. The first incident, a violent murder of a 
political activist, occurred in 2006; and the second incident, a clash between two major 
political parties and a more recent example, occurred in 2011.  
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Example one:
The victim was the President of political party Union unit. In 1998 and again in 2003, 
he was elected as the Member, Union Parishad. The victim became involved with politics 
since the liberation war in 1971, becoming a dominant grassroots leader. Eventually, 
to establish political control, he formed a group of 7 to 8 people, which mediated and 
resolved land conflicts, family disputes and other local conflicts. Local supporters of the 
opposition, however, alleged that the group was also involved in illegal and corrupt 
practices, and it forcibly took disputed lands from the legal owners; he furthermore 
controlled a local fishing wharf, as well as the wholesale fishery market attached to the 
wharf, in which according to local residents the fishermen and fish traders would have to 
pay extortion fees.   
At the time of the event, the accused was a UP Chairman and a Vice-President of the current 
opposition party’s local unit. He was reputedly involved in a number of criminal activities, 
such as looting, plundering, terrorist activities, and land grabbing among others. He was 
locally known to run a 27 members group of miscreants. Through a local journalist, our 
research team found at least eight families who claimed that their lands were forcibly 
grabbed by the UP Chairman and his team, for a sum of nearly 500 decimals of land, 
and another 400 decimals of khas land in one ferry site.  In 2003, he ran for the Union 
Parishad Chairman post, and with the blessings of the MP, he was elected. Upon his 
election, he tried to regain the control of the wharf and he failed.  
The victim was murdered in early February of 2006 in the morning. The attack was 
carried out at a wharf, just 2 kilometers from the Union and 12 kilometers from the local 
police station. As per the case statement and charge-sheet, on 1st February 2006 the 
victim left his residence at 7:30am and was waiting for the boat to cross the river. A 
series of opposition youth league members and the then UP chair (and Vice-President of 
Union opposition party) carried out the attack on the victim with hand weapons, first with 
a machete and then clubs. They beat the victim to near death. After he managed to yell for 
help, locals rushed to the scene and the attackers fled. The victim was immediately taken 
to Apollo Hospital, Dhaka where he died in February 2006. A case was filed with the 
local Police Station several days later. According to the police charge-sheet, the UP chair 
was the principal accused of that murder.
The lower court declared verdict on 2012 and the principal accused and two others were 
given the capital punishment in absentia. Other accused fugitives are jailed for different 
tenure. According to the interviewee the principal accused is at present living in Kuwait.
The precise motive for the murder is not clear. Locals cite a variety of potential reasons 
for this brutal murder. First, the victim presented a political threat due to his organizing 
capacity, refusing to join the party of the accused; second, the victim allegedly slapped 
the father of a key political ally of the accused; and third, the two sides were quarrelling 
over control of a local fishing wharf.  
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Example two:
In April of 2011, a local opposition party unit held a rally with grassroots leaders, in a 
location three kilometers from the main Upazila town center. There are conflicting reports 
of precisely what happened in this clash of political groups. One version, which appeared 
in the police report, stated that opposition groups occupied the street and refused to 
move, prompting the police to clear the protestors. Injuries resulted on the police side, 
which led to a number of arrests.  
News reports and local eyewitness accounts tell a very different story. The meeting was 
held in a local opposition party office, with many local opposition leaders and followers 
in attendance. Local leaders were delivering their speeches on mike. It was a small room 
and many workers were standing outside the office. At 5pm local time, Police and ruling 
party supporters, especially from their youth league, attacked the meeting with rocks, 
sticks, shotguns, and tear gas. Police used rubber bullets, shotguns and tear gas while the 
others men joined them with local arms.   
At least 50 opposition supporters were injured, with several hit by rubber bullets and 
shotgun fires from Police. Scores were injured.  Bullet-hit leaders were immediately taken 
to Dhaka for treatment while others were treated at local hospital. Police later at 10pm, 
filed a case against 126 opposition leaders for “obstructing people’s movement” and 
infighting. Police instantly arrested 45 local leaders. All leaders arrested are now free as 
a district court dismissed the charges against the accused.
According to opposition leader, the main reason of this attack was to weaken the 
opposition party in that area. If so, the approach was quite successful. Opposition leaders 
and workers abandoned all political activities and mobilization. They even avoided big 
rallies and never tried to enforce hartal or blockades declared by their central committee. 
Several of their leaders faced criminal charges and jailed, though eventually released 
when the case was dropped. Other mid-level leaders left and currently live elsewhere. 
Case two:  Examples of political violence
Example one:
One of the major incidents of political violence occurred in March of 2014 in the Case 2 
area. The location was about 25 kilometers from the city center, in an Upazila town. After 
the 5 January 2014 parliamentary election, the new government soon declared Upazila 
election schedule. The election in this particular Upazila was held on 15th March 2014. 
The violence ensued on 16th March, the next day after the election.  
On the eve of 15th March election voting, when vote counting of a particular union 
showed that the opposition party candidate for Upazila chair received over 100 votes 
of the approximately 1,000 votes cast. As a result, members and supporters of the ruling 
party, who early declared that not a single vote in the opposition candidate’s favor would 
be tolerated, were furious. The ruling party candidate was re-elected with more than 800 
votes out of total 1,000 votes cast. However, according to local journalists and residents, 
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two particular local political figures publicly threatened repercussions for supporters of the 
opposition: the local Union Parishad Chairman and a ruling party leader who is also a 
nephew of the local MP. They stated that they wanted those supporters who cast votes in 
opposition candidate’s favor show up publicly and threatened of repercussion.  
On the same night 25-30 supporters led by three members of the UP attacked the house 
of an opposition party supporter. They vandalized, damaged and looted the property. On 
the following (16th March) morning, the local MP threatened opposition party leaders and 
workers to close their shops in the local bazaar. While all opposition supporters, in fear of 
backlash, closed their shops, one supporter, a mobile mechanic by profession, decided to 
open his shop. The MP along with a few of his followers, such as his bodyguard, members 
of the Upazila committee and others, arrived at the bazaar on motorbikes. They engaged 
in s scuffle with the shop owner. Upon hearing the news, the shop owners’ relatives and 
dozens of opposition party supporters cadres from the area thronged at the place and 
attacked the MP and his associates. The MP was severely beaten and they sustained 
serious injuries. The MP was dumped in the nearby pond unconscious. According to the 
Daily Prothom Alo (2014), several of his associates sustained serious injuries from the 
attack, including broken hands and lacerations on their heads and bodies sustained. 
Ruling party supporters responded heavy-handedly. They turned out in large numbers with 
simple weapons (sticks, rods, machete, petrol, kerosene, and igniter) and vandalized 
over a dozen shops owned by opposition supporters, burnt to ashes a number of their 
houses, looted and damaged other properties. An estimated 15-20 opposition supporters 
were injured. Ruling party supporters simultaneously attacked the opposition supporters 
in several areas simultaneously. The national dailies reported the following damage—10 
houses of opposition party men were set on fire and 12 shops were looted (Prothom Alo, 
2014), though victims reported at that the damage was at least twice these figures. 
The attack continued for seven days. Local police did not arrive at the scene to protect 
the innocents. About the incident the Officer-in-Charge (OC) responded to journalists 
that: “none has reported to police or filed any case” (Hossain, 2014). Moreover, the 
police station was 23 kilometers away from the crime scene. One victim said, “Police 
and administration played completely passive role during the attack and later joined the 
[ruling party] in intimidating the [the opposition members] only because the main attacker 
is the nephew of local MP”.
Following the events, three cases were filed with the local police station against the victim 
opposition party activists. The first case was filed by the local Union Parishad Chairman; 
22 opposition activists were accused of arson and looting under the “Speedy Trial 
Tribunal Act”. Another two cases were filed by a Union Parishad Member, one against 
12 opposition activists and another against 16 opposition activists, with the principal 
accused being the Union opposition party President and Vice-President, amongst others. 
Soon after the violence and the filing of the case, all opposition party activists fled from 
the area and currently live outside. Later in the Speedy Trial Tribunal case, 12 out of 16 
opposition supporters were freed from charges.  
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Example two:
Another major incident of electoral violence occurred in August of 2013, on a bridge 
located about 2 kilometer away from the Upazila Administration. The so-called ‘bridge’ is 
less than 100 meters in length and connects east and west side of a union.
As the 10th Parliamentary election approached, national politics was in turmoil. Both 
parties failed to reach consensus on the election mechanism. Processions, public meetings, 
and violent street protests for and against the electoral mechanism were rampant. The 
opposition was leading indiscriminate hartals and blockades nationwide. The local 
opposition also sought to enforce the national party programs. In August of 2013, the 
opposition alliance called for such a hartal. The local ruling party men, on the other hand, 
vowed to resist the hartal and not to allow them to disrupt public life at any cost. 
According to opposition party leaders, in the run up of the 10th Parliament election (5 
January 2014 election), local leaders of the opposition parties started regrouping. They 
organized an “Iftar Party” inviting all local leaders of opposition party from all ten local 
party units.  
According to eye witnesses (both opposition supporters and local residents), about 150-
200 opposition supporters, in a motorcade of a bus and several Nasimon (mini-tempo like 
transport that can carries 15-20 people each), and motorcycles, started from an opposition 
office in the afternoon. The motorcade was en route to the Iftar Party. When it reached 
the bridge (1.5 kilometer from the source), 40-50 ruling party supporters, waiting on the 
both side of the bridge, attacked the motorcade. They were armed with machetes, clubs, 
bricks and stones. After an initial attack from a blockade, opposition supporters jumped 
out of the transport vehicles and frantically attempted to flee the scene. Other groups of 
attackers then joined the first group and vandalized the vehicles, indiscriminately beating 
the opposition supporters. The attack continued for 35-40 minutes. Another group of 
ruling party supporters waiting nearby and patrolling on the street attacked the fleeing 
men and beat them mercilessly. In total, 40-50 opposition supporters were injured, while 
two or three of them were chopped with machetes.
Local opposition supporters and journalists claimed that, after the attack on the motorcade, 
a group of 10-15 ruling party supporters returned to a local bazaar and attacked several 
pro-opposition shop owners in the market. They were severely beaten by hockey sticks. 
Two opposition supporters were severely beaten. One of them, after undergoing treatment 
for six months, succumbed to his injuries and died in the district hospital.
Victim opposition supporters did not file any allegation or case with the local police 
station. One victim said that, “when the Upazila Chairman himself is involved, how come 
we can expect justice from the local police or administration. Hence we did not file any 
case.” Besides, the victim alleged that, on many other occasions, opposition supporters 
sought to file cases were arrested by local police. For that reason, opposition supporters 
avoided visiting local police station. 
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Conclusion
The chapter presents case studies of two constituencies found in the survey, and focuses 
on the mechanics of and actors involved in land grabbing and political violence. From the 
case studies, several observations emerge. First, a culture of fear prevails in the two case 
study areas, among both journalists and the local population. This meant that it was quite 
challenging to develop full and accurate stories regarding all of the individuals involved 
in the criminal activities. The fear stemmed from both the potential of violence, but also 
court cases against journalists. The general population was often hesitant to respond to 
questions, especially as relates to the involvement of mastaans and politicians in land 
grabbing. As a result, our team attempted to provide as much reliable information as 
possible in these case studies, excluding much information from the occasionally scarce 
informants available.
Second, the cases highlight how the prosperous industries of housing and shrimp farming 
lead to a premium on land that inspires actors to grab land, often using violence. The 
actors driving major instances of land grabbing vary, at times local individuals such as 
businesses, and at other times, national conglomerates. The cases suggest that all the 
actors, though, must work closely with the local power structures in order to grab land. 
However, when those power structures turn against the actors, particularly when they are 
aligned with the opposing political parties, then land grabbing becomes difficult.  
Third, land owners who are at risk of land grabbing may organize and, if conditions are 
right, successfully halt land grabbing. The case against the national conglomerate best 
highlights this dynamic. When the social welfare association pulled together and held 
extensive demonstrations, it helped turn the tide against the major national conglomerate. 
However, organizing alone may not be sufficiently effective, particularly when the local 
power structure is intent on land grabbing. National factors such as political alliances and 
media coverage support these initiatives. Furthermore, such organizing tends to emerges 
from private lands being grabbed, but does not occur with khas land, putting that type of 
land at greater risk.   
Fourth, political violence is committed on both sides of the political divide; these cases 
highlight that mastaan-ism and party supporters, especially in the student and youth 
leagues, overlap substantially. While the cases do not identify particular independent 
mastaans operating in the examples, they do highlight that party supporters use strong-
arm tactics to intimidate the opposing side, and also for land grabbing. Also, in the 
examples, the main individuals who overlap as leading the violence are politicians, 
suggesting that they play an important role in directing violent activities at the local level. 
Further research is needed to further develop these cases. Case studies of other regions 
where intense mastaan activity is found would test and allow for further develop of the 
idea that economic gains from land grabbing fuels mastaan power. A deeper look at the 
process by which khas land is grabbed is required, though difficult given the lack of data. 
An inside look of student and youth leagues would aid in understanding the dynamics of 
political violence, and the intersection with mastaanism overall.
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5. Conclusion
Main points of the research
This research analyzes local power structures, and particularly the role of mastaans. 
Chapter 2 summarizes the results of a survey of journalists in seven constituencies, in 
randomly selected in each of the seven divisions of Bangladesh. The analysis of the 
survey data identifies a number of cross-cutting trends, with some regional variation. 
First, the most common and profitable forms of crime for profit are land grabbing and 
drug dealing. Politicians and mastaans are heavily involved in land grabbing, while 
politicians, the police and mastaans dominate drug dealing in the constituencies.  
Land that is grabbed is most commonly khas land, i.e. government owned land. When 
such land is taken, it is generally used for shops, though there was some regional variation; 
land grabbed in the Khulna division constituency focused on shrimp farms, and the land 
grabbed in the Dhaka division constituency – which bordered the Dhaka metropolitan 
area – tended to use grabbed land primarily for housing the growing urban population, 
as well as shops.  
As relates to electoral activities, the main areas of illegal activities here include political 
violence and patronage. The most common forms of patronage are the distribution of 
benefits from the Vulnerable Group Development Program (VGD) and the Vulnerable 
Group Feeding Program (VGF), though the distribution of government contracts also 
occurs frequently, while others vary based on the context. Although respondents generally 
state that politicians, the administration and student and youth leaders are involved in 
these efforts, the survey suggests that mastaans usually are not. (However, as described in 
other research in this project, student and youth leaders are often involved in mastaan-like 
activities, so the difference is obscured). Meanwhile, demonstrations occurred somewhere 
between once a month and twice a week in all constituencies during the lead up to the 
national elections of January 2014; the demonstrations often become fierce, though with 
few grievous injuries or deaths resulting from electoral violence. Politicians and mastaans, 
along with student and youth leaders, were most commonly involved in electoral violence. 
However, in the analysis of the main factors whereby politicians won support in the 2008 
election, the factors that emerged strongest included commitment to rule of law and anti-
corruption, and commitment to development.  
The specific characteristics of mastaans are the following in the cases. Some mastaans are 
elected to public office, but more frequently they hold official positions in political parties, 
and they almost always have a strong link to a politician. Mastaans have often been 
arrested at least once, but are rarely prosecuted and even more rarely convicted. Finally, 
mastaan power is increasing over time as well.
Given the role of politicians in mastaan-type behavior, chapter 3 peruses the finances of 
the figure often at the head of the local power structure: the Member of Parliament. The 
idea is that, if politicians’ wealth increases dramatically while in power, then it suggests 
a possibility that they are involved in criminal activities. The chapter uses the declaration 
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forms of MP candidates, submitted in 2008 and 2013, and limited to the 300 territorial 
MPs who were elected in the general elections of 2008 and 2014. The main observations 
emerging from the analysis of these forms are the following:
1.  The MP asset data is highly flawed, and requires an improved 
verification process.  As mentioned, there are a number of items in the forms that 
are not completed, or have unbelievable results, such as zero income.  MPs will also 
have a bias for under-reporting income and assets.  Further issues are presented in 
Appendix 1. Therefore, the results of our analysis may not accurately reflect reality.
2.  Across the board, there are dramatic increases in the assets of MPs 
from 2008 to 2013, whether financial assets, land, gold or income. The 
most dramatic increase is in the area of financial assets – including securities, bonds 
and savings amongst others, where the average MP held 5,136 percent more in 
2013 than in 2008. The average aggregate income of MPs rose 324 percent during 
the same time period, with growth primarily in business income, at 491 percent. 
Parliamentarians held 21.7 percent more gold on average in 2013 than in 2008, and 
20 percent more land in the same period.  Inflation during the period, as measured by 
increases in the CPI, was approximately 44.4 percent.
3.  The assets and income of territorial MPs, as well as the growth in 
these income and assets, is highly skewed to the wealthiest MPs. 
The analysis mainly breaks this down by quintile, showing top-most quintile of MPs 
earned an average aggregated income that was 41 times that of the bottom quintile 
in 2008, which increased to 126 times in 2013. The amount of gold owned by one 
MP increased from 30 to 1,144 bhori (11.664 grams), and the other from 10 to 870 
bhori. The MP with the highest amount of financial assets in 2013 held BDT 32,500 
million (approximately USD 426 million), while the MP owning the second highest 
amount of financial assets in 2013 exceeded the assets of 295 other MPs, at over BDT 
3,600 million.
4.  The analysis divided MPs into two groups, MPs re-elected in 2014 and 
an ‘others’ group, showing that the groups generally experienced 
increases in wealth over time, with some variation. For the re-elected MPs, 
the increase of aggregate annual income was 355 percent from 2008 to 2013, 
and 292 percent for the ‘other’ group. The growth in estimated annual income for 
re-elected and ‘other’ groups was both large and slightly differing, at 227 and 403 
percent respectively. After removing the top five MPs in terms of financial assets, the 
re-elected group augmented their financial assets by 157 percent from 2008 to 2013, 
while the ‘other’ group increased by 99 percent when compared to their predecessors 
during the same time period. Meanwhile, the growth in land from 2008 to 2013 was 
large for MPs in the re-elected group, but not for ‘others’.  
5.  The number of MPs with criminal charges, and the total number of 
criminal charges for parliamentarians, declined from 2008 to 2013. 
There were 256 cases against 80 MPs in 2008, which diminished to just 34 cases 
against 17 MPs.  
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Chapter 4 presents case studies of two constituencies found in the survey, and focuses 
on the mechanics of land grabbing and political violence. From the case studies, several 
observations emerge. First, a culture of fear prevails in the two case study areas, among 
both journalists and the local population. This meant that it was quite challenging to 
develop full and accurate stories regarding all of the individuals involved in the criminal 
activities. The fear stemmed from both the potential of violence, but also court cases 
against journalists. The general population was often hesitant to respond to questions, 
especially as they relate to the involvement of mastaans and politicians in land grabbing. 
As a result, our team attempted to provide as much reliable information as possible 
in these case studies, excluding much of the information from the occasionally scarce 
informants available.
Second, the cases highlight how the prosperous industries of housing and shrimp farming 
lead to a premium on land that inspires actors to grab land, often using violence. The 
actors driving major instances of land grabbing vary, at times being local individuals such 
as businesses, and at other times, national conglomerates. The cases suggest that all the 
actors, though, must work closely with the local power structures in order to grab land. 
However, when those power structures turn against the business interests, who may align 
with the opposing political parties, land grabbing becomes difficult.  
Third, land owners who are at risk of land grabbing may organize and, if conditions are 
right, successfully halt land grabbing. The case against the national conglomerate best 
highlights this dynamic. When the social welfare association in one of the case studies 
pulled together and held extensive demonstrations, it helped turn the tide against the 
major national conglomerate. However, organizing alone may not be sufficiently effective, 
particularly when the local power structure is intent on land grabbing. National factors 
such as political alliances and media coverage support these initiatives. Furthermore, such 
organizing tends to emerge from private lands being grabbed, but does not occur with 
khas land, putting that type of land at greater risk.   
Fourth, political violence is committed on both sides of the political divide; these cases 
highlight that mastaan-ism and party supporters, especially in the student and youth 
leagues, overlap substantially. While the cases do not identify particular independent 
mastaans operating in the examples, they do highlight that party supporters use strong-
arm tactics to intimidate the opposing side, and also for land grabbing. Moreover, in 
the examples, the main individuals who overlap as leading the violence are politicians, 
suggesting that they play an important role in directing violent activities at the local level. 
Overall ideas
Several broad conclusions emerge from the research. First, mastaans play a major role in 
the local socio political life across the variety of cases presented in this research. Their role, 
however, generally focuses on two areas: crimes for profit and electoral violence, and not 
patronage. Within crimes for profit, they are especially involved in land grabbing, drug 
dealing and extortion, which for the most part are the three most common and profitable 
crimes for profit at the local level in our study areas.
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Second, there is some notable variation across cases. One distinct area of variation is 
the level of mastaan power. While they hold some influence across the cases, they are 
much more powerful in the two case study areas scrutinized in chapter 4, than in the 
other five areas covered in the study. Such variation is not recognized in the literature on 
mastaan-ism in Bangladesh thus far, due to the limited research at the local level on the 
topic. There is also an enormous variation in MPs wealth, as well as the increases in MPs’ 
wealth over time.  
Third, putting insights from the three chapters together, this book develops a hypothesis 
to explain the level of mastaan power and increases in MPs’ wealth that depends on the 
economy of the locality. Chapter 2 suggests that mastaan power varies across cases, 
with the areas with greatest mastaan activities also having vibrant businesses. Chapter 
3 indicates that in a relatively small portion of constituencies, the wealth of MPs has 
increased dramatically, while in others there has been little increase. Chapter 4 looks 
at the context of constituencies in which mastaan power is greatest, and finds that the 
economic opportunities are unique in these contexts, with local actors using mastaan 
power in order to exploit those opportunities.  In the Case 1 area, a peri urban area 
of Dhaka, there was an enormous need for housing, leading both local and national 
companies to work with the local power structure to grab land to acquire real estate for 
housing development. The Case 2 area had a prosperous shrimp farming industry that 
relies on land in particular zones; as a result, local interests used strong arm techniques 
to capture shrimp farms.  
The use of mastaan power is correlated with the extensive use of violence in local 
politics as well. In these cases, incidents of murder and mass beatings occurred. In some 
instances, the same local actors were clearly involved in both areas; the economic and 
the political. These actors tended to be local politicians such as UP chairmen. Due to the 
secretive nature of the activities, though, it was difficult to establish the precise involvement 
of higher-level politicians, such as the Upazila chairs and the MPs. Local informants, when 
not afraid to speak, insisted that they were involved and even directing many of these 
activities.
Recommendations
There are no short-term solutions to the current situation in Bangladesh, given the 
emergence of powerful interests that facilitate the rise of mastaans in the country. As 
documented in this study, mastaans have access to a variety of weapons, are involved 
in extremely lucrative criminal activities, and are often allied with other powerful local 
figures such as politicians and business owners. A deliberate effort to establish justice 
at the local level is needed, which will be a long-term struggle against these strong, and 
often firmly embedded, interests.
Simple solutions will not work, such as a standard ‘improve rule of law’ approach. 
Measures of the rule of law in Bangladesh indicate that it is weak relative to the region; 
as stated in the introduction, Bangladesh rates as third worst in the region, on par with 
Pakistan and only superior to Afghanistan. The court system has nearly 3 million cases as 
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backlog. At the same time, the police are quite weak in facing these problems. According to 
a Transparency International survey of citizens (TIB, 2012)4, among the main government 
services, 75.8 percent of citizens experience corruption in law enforcing agencies, 59.0 
percent in land administration and 57.1 percent in judicial services. Evidence from this 
book also indicates that the police are often compromised or unable to challenge the 
local power structures. Chapter 2 presented evidence that police are complicit in drug 
dealing in their own catchment areas.  Chapter 4 showed that police are, at times, unable 
to prosecute known murders, as well as unable to stop the fits of political violence that 
take place in their communities. Other times, they appear to be complicit in the electoral 
violence. While efforts to improve justice institutions are important, they are overwhelmed 
with responsibilities and at times involved in the very crimes they are meant to stop.  
Long term, multi-faceted solutions are therefore needed, that depend on mobilizing 
the ingenuity and creativity of people at the local level. There is no silver bullet. These 
solutions depend on empowering local actors to establish justice in their communities, and 
to stand up against these interests.  This will only come about through a sustainable social 
movement led by an enlightened political vision.  
This book provides some guidance as to ways to impede these powerful interests, and to 
achieve more just outcomes for the poor. There are two complementary approaches that 
should be taken. First, land management and property rights among the poor should be 
improved. Second, creative ways to restore the rule of law and oppose the interests of 
mastaan networks need to be developed.  
In the first area, evidence in the book strongly suggests that land, or rather the profits 
gained from the control of land, drive many of the mastaan activities. As a result, one 
approach for gaining control of these interests is ensuring that land profits cannot be 
captured through the threat of violence used by mastaans. Central to this is to improve land 
management and strengthen property rights among the poor and even the middle class. 
Such an approach would limit the rents available, and therefore reduce the incentives to 
turn to violence in order to capture them.
Assessments of land regulation in Bangladesh suggest that many areas are in need 
improvement (Barkat et al., 2001; Care, 2003; Feldman and Geisler, 2011). The role 
of violence is also acknowledged in much of this literature, especially as relates to khas 
land (Barkat et al., 2001). This book points to the need for renewed efforts to improve 
land administration, where the expanding Bangladeshi economy will inspire even greater 
profits to be made, leading the pressures on the integrity of land administration will 
increase.   
Further transparency can aid in protecting land. As our research team found, local land 
administration officials are often unable or unwilling to share official information on land 
ownership, particularly for khas land. An effective use of the Right to Information Act 
2009 would help to make such information public, and should aid in halting the grabbing 
of such land by elites.  Improved and more easily accessible public records would assist in 
this effort. Similarly, greater efforts to register the land of the poor and middle classes, in 
order to provide clear and indisputable evidence of their ownership, is another necessary 
step towards improving land management. 
4 http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/files/HHSurvey-ExecSum-Eng-fin.pdf
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Along with transparency is the need for public education on land administration. 
Empowering citizens with the knowledge of land documents, of processes for measuring 
and registering land, and of the roles and responsibilities of government administrators 
will be necessary to address the land problem. The pilot project of the Human Rights and 
Legal Services Program of BRAC presents an interesting example of such an effort at 
public education, at least in the area of land registration
Strong support for land litigation by the poor is a difficult but necessary step as well. Such 
cases tend to be expensive in terms of documentation and legal expenses, and also last 
for years on end, but can sometimes yield results for citizens. The poor therefore require 
legal aid, including financial aid to cover these expenses. 
In the second area, the book suggests that interests align themselves in pursuit of profits 
particularly from land. Finding mechanisms to oppose these interests is a critical area of 
work. As mentioned, however, traditional rule of law institutions such as the police and 
criminal justice system, while requiring further support, are unlikely to yield results in the 
short and medium term. Creative methods are instead needed.
One potential approach is organizing citizens at the local level. Organizations of citizens 
can sometimes successfully oppose land grabbers. Strategic use of the media, along with 
a certain amount of political luck, allowed one organization to halt the expansion of a 
project from a major national real estate firm. The organization and the business then 
negotiated a settlement to ensure the protection of the property of many small and medium 
sized landowners.  
Steps need to be taken to ensure the freedom and integrity of the press. Unfortunately, 
a finding of our research is that local journalists are often intimidated from covering 
important crimes in their communities, and are even hesitant to discuss these cases 
with outside researchers such as our team. Greater protection is needed to ensure their 
safety. One means of intimidation is the use of defamation and other legal cases against 
journalists; they should therefore receive legal aid to support them in their defense. 
However, more difficult is the threat of violence, which requires greater attention from 
human rights organizations.  
These measures will be limited in their impact, however, without a more fundamental 
change in local governance. Investment in local leadership is needed, to ensure that 
citizens organize and mobilize to improve law and order in their communities. The youth, 
who are mostly dis-engaged with political and social movements, also represent an often 
un-tapped resource in combatting the current mastaan activities. Many proponents of 
violence are young people, in a variety of mastaan-like activities, as shown in survey results 
where members of students and youth leagues were heavily involved in political violence 
as well as patronage. Productive engagement of these youths, including economic and 
social opportunities, is needed in order to impede their participation in criminal activities.
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Further research
Given that the literature is scarce on these topics, much more research is needed. The 
topics covered in this study require a nationally representative survey to cover the great 
diversity in the country. The survey in this book is not nationally representative, but rather 
a small sample of the entire nation. As such, its conclusions are not generalizable to the 
whole of Bangladesh. We have presented a hypothesis that economic opportunities drive 
both increases in MP wealth and mastaan activities, but this should be tested across the 
nation, as other factors may play a significant role in mastaan-ism. Such work could also 
provide a comprehensive explanation for why electoral violence and patronage is more 
extensive in certain areas of the country than others.  
A variety of individual topics require focused research. While there is some analysis of 
local law and order institutions, studies should scrutinize their ability to manage local 
property disputes, as well as the ability of the police to manage political violence and 
other forms of crime. In regards to land issues, while several studies have been conducted, 
better understanding of the institutions involved in land registration and property dispute 
resolution is needed, identifying weaknesses – including logistical and political – that 
interfere with their legitimate operation. Within this topic, the incentives of relevant 
officials are critical to the analysis. Such research is particularly important in growth 
areas, such as peri urban areas, in which real estate prices are booming and rural land 
is being converted for housing and other forms of real estate development. Similarly, as 
rental housing – and slums in particular - is becoming increasingly common due to rapid 
urbanization, tenure insecurity will require greater attention.  
Given the weakness of the formal justice sector, further research on the informal justice 
systems is needed. Village courts are on the rise in Bangladesh, which involve politicians. 
The integrity of these informal institutions should be analyzed across a variety of diverse 
contexts. Justice institutions, both formal and informal, in urban areas have largely 
been neglected in the literature and deserve in depth research. Mastaans may feature 
prominently in slum areas, including among justice institutions.  
The youth also play an important role in local political and criminal life, and should be 
studied. An inside look of student and youth leagues would aid in understanding the 
dynamics of political violence, and their participation in mastaan activities overall. Such 
research may inform efforts to divert young people away from crime, and towards more 
productive activities, including politics, in the society. 
The study also raises topics for further research as regards the MP assets. The obvious 
topic for research is to explain the large increases in assets and income among many 
MPs.  For most variables, even the bottom quintile saw a large rise. Many MPs also did 
this while still in office. As such, future research and investigation should inquire into 
what is driving these increases in income, land, gold and financial assets. Research 
should particularly scrutinize how a select few MPs are able to grow their assets and 
income at very high rates. This is particularly true in the area of financial assets, including 
securities, bonds and savings bonds. However, in practically every variable, there was 
an extreme increase among the top quintile or the top few MPs.  Clearly, some MPs are 
able to improve their financial situation much more than others; comparing their activities 
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in constituencies would better enlighten these questions. In particular, research should 
investigate whether MPs use their position in public office for personal gain, whether to 
earn land, gold, income or financial assets. The data suggest that newly joined MPs in the 
10th Parliament did not have a strikingly lower set of assets in any of these areas, though 
this could be due to their relatively good connection with the party in power, or because 
wealthier individuals are becoming more likely to enter politics. The relatively strong 
growth in financial assets and business income points to efforts by MPs to increase their 
wealth while in office. Also, while this book provided a case study of a peri-urban area 
outside of Dhaka, Dhaka city deserves an exclusive study of mastaan-ism.
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Annexes
Annex 2.1
In total an MP receive BDT 99,000 per month.  The following is the breakdown:
•  Monthly allowance:  BDT 27,500
•  Constituency allowance:  BDT 7,500
•  Local office maintenance allowance:  BDT 9,000
•  Fuel cost: BDT 40,000
•  Medical allowance: BDT 7,000
•  Cosmetics and cookeries fee: BDT 4,000
•  Laundry fee: BDT 1,000
•  Miscellaneous: BDT 3,000
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Annex 2.2
The issues noted with the MP Asset Declaration system are listed below:
•  Unclear information 
 Quantitative information in the forms is often unclear to read. This problem arises 
as the majority of the forms have been filled up by hand and given the little space 
provided in entering the information, the entry becomes ambiguous.
•  Incomplete Information/ Current Value
 Often candidates leave out crucial information needed to assess his/her asset holdings. 
This is particularly seen in the affidavit form, where candidates are asked to provide 
both amount and value at purchase of their assets. Most candidates only mention the 
monetary value of their asset. Without information on the amount of asset holding, it 
becomes difficult to ascertain the candidate’s true asset wealth as 1) purchase value 
can be very low depending on the period the asset was bought 2) there is no mention 
of the purchase year or date to estimate the current asset value.
•  Missing/ Inaccurate Information 
 The forms often have crucial information missing, e.g. candidate’s annual income, 
total debt, sources of income, etc., either providing a zero or failing to enter any 
information. At times, the data entered is clearly not accurate as well, such as income 
statements from current MPs that do not even reflect the minimal income that MPs earn.
•  Missing Forms 
 The forms for several candidates were not found on the EC website. Particularly, 
Income Statements were found missing in many cases.
•  Varied Units
 In many cases it was found that asset information for the same category is given 
in different units. For example, a candidate is often found to specify the different 
amounts of agricultural land he/ she has in acre, decimal and katha. No standard 
unit is followed and often traditional units are used, making it difficult to ascertain the 
candidate’s total holding of a particular asset.
•  Redundant Categories 
 The forms often have redundant categories, e.g. for sources of income the Affidavit 
asks the candidates to enter information for both categories of ‘Job’ and ‘Profession’. 
This may be confusing for candidates and the same information may be entered more 
than once. 
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Recommendations include the following:
•  Establish a strong verification system: The Elections Commission should seek to 
verify the information provided by the applicants.  Such a verification system may be 
more or less intensive, and select different samples of forms to verify, but some system 
is needed to ensure that the information is accurate. See http://www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/47489446.pdf for more details.  
•  Online Form Application System: An online form application system would allow 
candidates to type in their information and submit the application online. Mandatory 
information fields may ensure that crucial information is not missed and submitted 
for the candidates. This would also assist in saving time and resources for the EC 
and candidates as well as ensure that the information provided is unambiguous. The 
electronic format would further ensure the information is accessible to the public and 
easily analyzed.
•  Ensure all forms are complete: verification is needed to ensure that all fields are 
completed and that answers are reasonable. The online system would help to ensure 
this, but simple perusal of the forms and feedback to applicants would aid in this 
efforts.
•  Review and Refine Forms: There is a need to review the current forms to eliminate 
redundant and confusing asset categories, to specify standard units and include 
additional information that may be useful, e.g. year of asset purchase.
•  Form Fill-up Guidance: An example of a correctly completed form should be 
uploaded to the EC website to guide candidates while filling out their forms. 
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Annex 3.1: Survey Logistics
Selecting coordinator journalist
We approached the Dhaka office of a leading Bengali daily to find their district 
correspondents. We thus got contact details of correspondents of seven constituencies, 
our study areas, of the respective daily. We then contacted him over phone, briefed the 
person our research aims, objectives and research questions; the survey process; the 
respondent types; and requested the person if s/he could coordinate us in doing the 
survey. The journalists usually enquired about the details of the research, the persons 
involved, and the intention of doing the work. In most of the cases, we selected the 
journalist we first contacted as coordinator; in some cases, however, when the first contact 
declined to be coordinator (primarily owing to their other affiliation or busy schedule), we 
requested the journalist for a reference that we can contact.  In all cases, we succeeded 
the second point of reference as our coordinator. 
Selecting the respondents
The respondents were selected during our visit to the study site. Upon arrival at the study 
site, we contacted our coordinator journalist and request him to make an appointment 
with the President and/or Secretary of the local press club. During the meeting with 
the President and/or Secretary, we handed them over a two pager Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQ) about the research and briefed them about the research and request 
for their help in conducting the survey. We then collected the list of journalists registered 
with the local press club and their contact details, and any other accredited journalists 
not registered for various reasons (often grouping and politics lead to the division among 
journalist, and we found, at least in three constituencies, more than one press clubs in 
a single Upazila). With the help of President and/or Secretary and the Coordinator 
journalist, we then reached out to every journalist over phone and made the invitation. 
In some cases, when we could not persuade any journalist, we immediately took help 
from the press club President or Secretary and made them call the journalist directly. 
Hence, for methodological soundness, we put our best effort to confirm the attendance of 
ALL journalists; where it was not possible we at least confirmed the attendance of more 
than 95% journalists. To ensure this, we sometimes needed to adjust our time and book 
a suitable venue so that the journalists find the most convenient way to attend the survey. 
Conducting the survey
On the survey date, we contacted the press club President, the Secretary; the research team 
reached at the survey venue 30 minutes before the start and checked the arrangement 
for sitting and logistics. The venues hired for the survey were usually either the local press 
clubs or auditoriums that could accommodate the number of journalists invited. When the 
President/Secretary of the press club confirmed that every invited journalist arrived at the 
venue, we started the proceeding by giving a small introduction about the research, the 
process, the purpose of the research, and the identity of the persons involved. We also 
took a few questions from the respondents at the beginning as to their enquiry about the 
research. Then we distributed the survey questionnaire with the help of the Coordinator 
journalist. After distribution, the research briefly discussed every question, page-by-page, 
and responded to any clarification sought.  It took about 20 minutes. When the journalists 
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started responding to the questions, the researchers invigilated the room and responded 
to any queries raised. The survey took 90 - 120 minutes, depending on the respondents’ 
understanding.  After filling up the questionnaires, the research team again requested the 
respondents to check a few complex questions and if they were answered accurately. 
This took another 10 minutes. Meanwhile, the research team requested the journalists 
not to leave their seats or submit the questionnaires. The research team then visited each 
journalist individually to collect and during this process, the research team spent 5 minutes 
for the final checking of the complex questions. If found any error, the research team 
further requested the respondents to take additional 2-3 minutes to correct them. Through 
this, the research team ensured that the respondents understood each and every question 
and answered accordingly.
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Annex 3.2 Survey for Journalists
Survey for Journalists
Introduction
Thank you for attending this survey session for our study on local power structures in 
Bangladesh. This is an academic exercise where we are surveying journalists all over 
Bangladesh. It will help us to understand the current situation at the local level in a 
comprehensive manner.
When filling out this questionnaire, we do not ask your name. The questionnaire is totally 
anonymous to ensure that you may answer the questions in an unbiased manner.  
When completing the questionnaire, please answer the questions in reference to this 
constituency only, and not in reference to areas outside.  
We thank you again and look forward to your responses.
1.  Section one: Background
 1.1. Are you a journalist?    Yes____     No_____      
 1.2. How many years have you worked as a journalist? _____________________
 1.3. Are you from ______ ?    Yes____     No_____      
  1.1.1. If no, where are you from? _____________________
2.  Section Two: General Crime in the Area
 2.1. How would you rate the law and order situation in your area over the period of 
the last 10 years comparing to other areas of Bangladesh?  (Please check only 
one)
Crime is very bad    _____    
Crime is bad    _____   
Crime is manageable     _____   
Crime is not frequent   _____   
Crime almost never happens  _____   
2.2. Please rank the top three most common forms of crime for profit in your area in 
terms of frequency over the period of the last 10 years.
 (Most common = 1, Second most common = 2, Third most common = 3).
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Form of Crime for Profit Rank (1 = most common)
1 Land grabbing
2 Drug smuggling
3 Arms smuggling
4 Drug dealing
5 Extortion
6 Theft/ Robbery
7 Control over the garment left-over business
8 Killing/ Violence for hire
Are there other common forms of crime?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
2.3. Please rate the frequency of the most common form of crime comparing to other 
areas of Bangladesh (#1 above).  (Please tick only one).
Compared to other areas of Bangladesh, rank #1 is:
 Very frequent   _____    
 Frequent    _____   
 Somewhat frequent  _____   
 Not frequent   _____   
 Almost never happens  _____   
2.4. Who is involved in the most common form of crime (#1)?  Please check all that 
apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
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Other?  Please describe.
 ____________________________________________________________________
2.5. Please rate the frequency of the most profitable form of crime (#1) compared to 
other areas of Bangladesh.  (Please tick only one).
Compared to other areas of Bangladesh, rank #1 in this area is:
 Very frequent   _____    
 Frequent    _____   
 Somewhat frequent  _____   
 Not frequent   _____   
 Almost never happens  _____   
2.6. Who is involved in the #2 most common form of crime?  Please check all that 
apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe.
 ____________________________________________________________________
2.7. Please rank the top three most profitable form of crime for profit in your area in 
terms of frequency over a period of 10 years.
 
(Most profitable = 1, Second most profitable = 2, Third most profitable = 3).
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Form of Crime for Profit Rank (1 = most common)
1 Land grabbing
2 Drug smuggling
3 Arms smuggling
4 Drug dealing
5 Extortion
6 Theft/ Robbery
7 Control over the garment left-over business
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
2.8. Please rate the frequency of the most profitable form of crime compared to other 
areas of Bangladesh.  (Please tick only one).
Compared to other areas of Bangladesh, rank #1 is:
 Very frequent   _____    
 Frequent    _____   
 Somewhat frequent  _____   
 Not frequent   _____   
 Almost never happens  _____   
2.9. Who is involved in the most profitable form of crime?  Please check all that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
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2.10. Who is involved in the second most profitable form of crime?  Please check all 
that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1. Government official
2. Business person
3. Mastaan
4. Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5. Politician
6. Police
7. Large landowner
8. Non-political influential leader
9. Media professionals
10. Student/ youth leaders
11. Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12. Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
2.11. Is there a form of crime in your area that is not found in every area of Bangladesh? 
What is it?
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
3.  Section Three: Details on Land
3.1. What kind of land is grabbed most often in your area?  Please rank the top three.
Type of Land Grabbed Most Often?
1 Khas land
2 Char land
3 Small farmer land
4 Unused private urban land
5 Fallow land
6. Large farmer land
7 Vested property (left by the immigrant minorities)
8 Wetlands
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9 Minority’s land
10 Government’s departments’ owned land
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
3.2. Once land is grabbed in your area, what is it used for usually?  Please rank the 
top three.
Type of Land Ranking (1 = most common)
1 Agriculture
2 Fish pond
3 Housing/ Real Estate
4 Shops/ market construction
5 Factories
6 Mosque, madrassa or any other religious institution
7 Nothing
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
3.3. Who is involved in the most common form of land grabbing?  Please check all 
that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
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Other?  Please describe.
 ____________________________________________________________________
4. Section Four: Government Reward for Political Support
4.1. Please rank three most important ways in which the politicians reward people 
with government resources in exchange for political support.
Form of Government Patronage Rank (1 = most common)
1 VGD/VGF distribution
2 Government contracts
3 SMC positions/ College management committee position
4 Food for work program
5 Fertilizer and seed distribution
6 Khas land/ wetlands access
7 Security from police
8 Access to market areas/ lease of market place
9 Other safety net programs (old age allowance, widow 
allowance, etc.)
10 Controlling transport business
11 Private employment (in politician’s factory, industry, farm 
or other business)
12 Public Employment (teaching position, government 
service, etc.)
Others?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
4.2. Who is involved in the most common form of government reward for political 
support (#1)?  Please check all that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
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9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
4.3. Who is involved in the second most common form of government reward for 
political support?  Please check all that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
4.4. Who is involved in the third most common form of government reward for political 
support?  Please check all that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
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10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
4.5. Please list the most common forms of government corruption in your area.
1.
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
2.
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
3.
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
5. Section Five: Elections and Political Violence
We would like to ask some questions about the lead up to the recent election in January 
2014:
5.1. How often did demonstrations occur in your area over the three months before 
the 2014 election?  Please check one.
Frequency
1 Several times a week
2 Once or twice a week
3 Once or twice a month
4 Almost never
5.2. How often did demonstrations turn violent in the lead up to the 2014 elections in 
this area?  Please check one.
Frequency
1 Several times a week
2 Once or twice a week
3 Once or twice a month
4 Almost never
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5.3. How many individuals do you estimate have died in the lead up to the recent 
election?
 ____________________________________________________________________
5.4. Who were instigating the electoral violence?  Please check all that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
5.5. Are any of the individuals instigating the electoral violence also involved in the 
top ranked forms of crime?  If so, check all that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
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Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
We would like to ask you about the election of 2008.
5.6. Please rank the top three most common ways that political parties encouraged 
voting support in previous election.
Way to win votes Rank
1 Commitment to anti-corruption/  law & order
2 Voter intimidation
3 Made voters believe the candidate is good for the locality and the 
country
4 Rewarded voters with government benefits (See elements in 
Section 4, the previous one)
5 Paid cash/ food for voting
6 Legal voter mobilization – rallies, events, door-to-door 
encouragement
7 Paid party activists/ other leaders to work for party with 
patronage
8 Inspired party loyalty among voters
9 Commitment to development activities
10 Simply provide alternative to the ruling party (Anti-incumbency)
11 Using religious sentiment
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
5.7. Please rank the top three most common illegal ways that political parties 
encouraged voting support in previous election.
Form of Government Patronage Rank (1 = most common)
1 VGD/VGF distribution
2 Government contracts
3 SMC positions/ College management committee 
position
4 Food for work program
5 Fertilizer and seed distribution
6 Khas land/ wetlands access
7 Security from police
8 Access to market areas/ lease of market place
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9 Other safety net programs (old age allowance, 
widow allowance, etc.)
10 Controlling transport business
11 Private employment (in politician’s factory, industry, 
farm or other business)
12 Public Employment (teaching position, government 
service, etc.)
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
5.8. Who was involved in the most highly ranked illegal way to win votes (#1)? 
Please check all that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
5.9. Were the same individuals involved in the most highly ranked illegal way to win 
votes (#1) and any of the top ranked crimes for profit?  Please check all that 
apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
113
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
5.10. Who was involved in the second most highly ranked illegal way to win votes 
(#2)?  Please check all that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
     Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
5.11. Were the same individuals involved in the second most highly ranked illegal 
way to win votes (#2) and any of the top ranked crimes for profit? 
 Yes = 1
 No = 0
 If Yes, which one?
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5.12. Who was involved in the third most highly ranked illegal way to win votes (#3)? 
Please check all that apply.
Individual Involved Involved?
1 Government official
2 Business person
3 Mastaan
4 Professional Group (lawyer, doctor, engineer, NGO, etc.)
5 Politician
6 Police
7 Large landowner
8 Non-political influential leader
9 Media professionals
10 Student/ youth leaders
11 Labor leaders (trade unions, transport association, etc.)
12 Non-political religious group
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
5.13. Were the same individuals involved in the third most highly ranked illegal way 
to win votes (#3) and any of the top ranked crimes for profit?  Please check all 
that apply.
 Yes = 1
 No = 0
 
 If Yes, which one?
6. Section Six: Mastaans and a Profile of a Mastaan
We would like to ask you about mastaans in your area, by which we mean strongmen 
who are involved in politics in an illegal manner.  
6.1. Do you feel that mastaans are powerful in the area?
Extremely powerful   _____    
Very powerful    _____   
Moderately powerful     _____   
A bit powerful    _____   
Not powerful at all   _____   
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6.2. Are the mastaans in your area powerful in terms of controlling criminal activities?
Extremely powerful   _____    
Very powerful    _____   
Moderately powerful     _____   
A bit powerful    _____   
Not powerful at all   _____   
6.3. Are the mastaans in your area powerful in terms of inciting extensive political 
violence?
Extremely powerful   _____    
Very powerful    _____   
Moderately powerful     _____   
A bit powerful    _____   
Not powerful at all   _____   
6.4. Are the mastaans in your area powerful in terms of influencing general elections?
Extremely powerful   _____    
Very powerful    _____   
Moderately powerful     _____   
A bit powerful    _____   
Not powerful at all   _____   
6.5. Are any of the mastaans female?
  Yes____      No _____      
6.6. Who is the most powerful mastaan in the area?
 ____________________________________________________________________
6.7. What kinds of crimes has this mastaan committed?  Please check all that apply.
Form of Crime for Profit
1 Land grabby
2 Drug smuggling
3 Arms smuggling
4 Drug dealing
5 Extortion
6 Theft/ Robbery
7 Control over the garment left-over business
8 Violent infighting for party position
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Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
6.8. What is the particular profession of this mastaan?  Please check only one.
Profession
1 Lawyer
2 Business person
3 Landowner
4 Media professional
6 Other professional position
7 None
6.9. Has this mastaan been arrested for a crime ever?
  Yes____     No_____      
6.10. Has this mastaan been prosecuted for a crime ever?
  Yes____     No_____      
6.11. Has this mastaan been convicted of a crime ever?
  Yes____     No_____      
6.12. Has this mastaan been elected to a political office?
  Yes____     No_____      
 If so, what position does he or she hold?
 ____________________________________________________________________
6.13. Does this mastaan have an official position in a political party?
  Yes____ No_____      
 If so, what position?
 ____________________________________________________________________
6.14. If no (in 6.12 and 6.13), is the mastaan strongly linked with a politician?
  Yes____  No_____      
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6.15. Was this mastaan involved in activities to influence the 2008 election?  Please 
check all that apply.
Way to win votes Rank
1 Commitment to anti-corruption/  law & order
2 Voter intimidation
3 Made voters believe the candidate is good for the locality and the 
country
4 Rewarded voters with government benefits (See elements in 
Section 4, the previous one)
5 Paid cash/ food for voting
6 Legal voter mobilization – rallies, events, door-to-door 
encouragement
7 Paid party activists/ other leaders to work for party with 
patronage
8 Inspired party loyalty among voters
9 Commitment to development activities
10 Simply provide alternative to the ruling party (Anti-incumbency)
11 Using religious sentiment
Other?  Please describe. 
 ____________________________________________________________________
6.16. What is the largest number of people that this mastaan has mobilized for a 
rally?
 ____________________________________________________________________
6.17. If the mastaan performs land grabbing, what is the largest number of people 
that this mastaan has mobilized to take over land?
 ____________________________________________________________________
6.18. What weapons does this mastaan have available?  Please check all that apply.
Weapons Check all that apply
1 Sticks
2 Knives
3 Machetes
4 Hand guns
5 Rifles
6 Explosive cocktails
7 Grenades
8 Automatic rifles
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6.19. How many murders or acts of manslaughter has the mastaan been accused of 
committing in his (or her) lifetime?
 ____________________________________________________________________
6.20. How many grievous injuries has the mastaan been accused of committing in his 
(or her) lifetime?
6.21. Does the mastaan work outside this area?  Please describe.
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
6.22. Does the mastaan lead groups responsible for electoral violence?
  Yes ____     No_____      
6.23. Are mastaans in general more powerful than 10 years ago or less powerful?
  Yes____     No_____      
7. Section Seven: Open Ended Questions
7.1.  Please describe how this most common form of crime usually works (See question 
2.2).  Areas to describe are: 
 How often does it happen? Who is the perpetrator?  Who is the victim?  How 
much violence is involved?  How much profit is involved?  
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
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7.2.  Please describe how this most profitable form of crime usually works (See question 
2.7).  Areas to describe are: 
 How often does it happen? Who is the perpetrator?  Who is the victim?  How 
much violence is involved?  How much profit is involved?  
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
7.3. Please briefly describe an example of a crime in your area that was shocking 
for you.
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
8. Section Eight: Thanks
Thank you very much for your participation in the survey.
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